South Eagle v. Utah Co. BoA

South Eagle v. Utah County Bd of Adjstmnt

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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South Eagle, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

Utah County Board of Adjustment, Utah County Commission, and Utah County,

Respondents and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040520-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 23, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 278

 

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Fourth District, Provo Department, 030401541

The Honorable Gary D. Stott

Attorneys: Donald E. McCandless and Thomas J. Scribner, Provo, for Appellant

Carlyle Kay Bryson and Robert J. Moore, Provo, for Appellees

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Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme.

ORME, Judge:

    We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented are readily resolved under applicable law.

    On appeal, we accord no particular deference to the district court's decision. See Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Instead, we review the Utah County Board of Adjustment's decision as if review of that decision had been available directly in this court. See id.

    "The Board will be found to have exercised its discretion within the proper boundaries unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Id. at 604. Moreover, "'[t]he court shall affirm the decision of the board . . . if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.'" Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). "'"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" Id. at 604 n.6 (citations omitted).

    At the outset, we note that Utah Code section 59-2-502(4) sets forth a clear definition of "land in agricultural use" for purposes of applying Utah Code section 17-27-806(2)(a)(i). See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502(4) (2004); id. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(i) (2001). Thus, section 59-2-502(4), as opposed to section 59-2-503, is the applicable section for determining whether under section 17-27-806(2)(a)(i) certain parcels resulting from a division of agricultural land will qualify as "land in agricultural use." Id. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(i). Section 59-2-502(4) defines "land in agricultural use" as "land devoted to the raising of useful plants and animals with a reasonable expectation of profit." Id. § 59-2-502(4) (emphasis added). Our review of the record reveals that substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion that it was not reasonable to expect South Eagle's land to be profitable under the proposed division of the land. In support of its conclusion, the Board considered statements from the planning commissioner, South Eagle's representative, and various members of the planning commission that water was not readily available to support the land, that dry farming would not be feasible, and that South Eagle may not qualify for grazing on some of the lots.(1)

    South Eagle also argues that the trial court should have denied the Board's motion for summary judgment because the Board, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, noted that the County Commission did not present any evidence on whether the property would be used for nonagricultural purposes. This argument is unavailing. In order for South Eagle to be exempt from the requirements it is seeking to avoid, each lot or parcel resulting from the proposed division of agricultural land must satisfy all three prongs of a three-pronged test. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a). Because South Eagle's parcels did not meet the requirements of the first prong ("land in agricultural use"), see id. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(i), it is irrelevant that the county presented no evidence on the third prong (property used for nonagricultural purposes). See id. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(iii).

    Finally, because we review the Board's decision as if review of that decision had been sought directly in this court, any perceived mistakes the Board may have made in making its motion for summary judgment have no bearing on this appeal. See Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603.

    Affirmed.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. South Eagle argues that the evidence considered by the Board was inadmissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. However, "[i]t is well settled that administrative hearings need not possess the formality of judicial proceedings. . . . Hearsay and other forms of evidence that might be inadmissible in a court of law may be considered during an administrative hearing." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus, without more evidence that it was fundamentally unfair to South Eagle for the Board to consider the statements, we uphold the Board's decision to consider them. See id. (noting that the "flexibility of administrative hearings" is tempered only by the "'necessity of preserving fundamental requirements of procedural fairness in administrative hearings'") (citation omitted).