Martinez v. Progressive

Martinez v. Progressive Northwestern Ins.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

----ooOoo----

Irma Martinez,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company,

Defendant and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040799-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 30, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 297

 

-----

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 970905939

The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn

Attorneys: Trent J. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Kristin A. Van Orman and James D. Franckowiak, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

-----

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

    Irma Martinez appeals the district court's denial of certain post-judgment motions, including a motion pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and a motion under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We affirm.

    "'A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion.'" Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110,¶9, 2 P.3d 451 (quoting Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998)). Furthermore, the scope of review of trial court orders denying rule 60(b) relief is limited. See id. at ¶19. On appeal from a rule 60(b) order, the appellate court "addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). The reviewing court will not reach the merits of the underlying judgment. See id. Review of rule 60(b) orders "must be narrowed in this manner lest rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals." Id.

    Martinez argued that the district court should set aside a signed minute entry regarding Martinez's motion for new trial. This court previously determined that the minute entry at issue was a final order and that Martinez's prior appeal from this order was untimely filed. See Martinez v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 2004 UT App 204 (mem.). The district court held it was bound to follow this court's ruling that the signed minute entry was a final order. The district court also held that there was no viable argument for excusable neglect. Thus, the district court denied Martinez's rule 60(b) motion, along with her "motion for an entry of final judgment."

    Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point of law is decided, "that ruling should be followed by a court of the same or a lower rank in subsequent cases confronting the same legal issue." State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995); see also State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (holding that vertical stare decisis "compels a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court. . . . Under this mandate, lower courts are obliged to follow the holding of a higher court."). Once this court ruled that the minute entry was a final order, stare decisis required that the district court make the same ruling, regardless of whether Martinez characterized her motion as one to "enter a final order" or to "set aside" the order under rule 60(b). Clearly, the district court's ruling upholding this court's decision was not an abuse of discretion.

    Moreover, Martinez has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it found there was no showing of excusable neglect. "Rule 60(b)(1) confers discretion upon a trial court judge to set aside a judgment for 'excusable neglect.'" Mini Spas v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). We have defined "excusable neglect" as "the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Id. The undisputed facts here do not support a claim that Martinez or her counsel diligently acted in a reasonably prudent manner in failing to file a notice of appeal until after it was due. With knowledge that the order denying her motion for new trial had been entered, such neglect or mistake was not excusable. Instead, the motion was an attempt to use rule 60(b) "as a 'back door' to a direct appeal of the underlying judgmen[t]." Franklin Covey, 2000 UT App 110 at ¶23. As set forth in Franklin Covey, "we will not countenance [an] attempt to use the 'back door' to obtain review of the underlying judgments of the trial court after failing to timely file a Notice of Appeal challenging them." Id. at ¶29. The district court properly denied Martinez's rule 60(b) motion along with the motion to set aside the minute entry.

    Finally, Martinez argues that the district court erred when it failed to grant her motion for an extension of time to file an appeal pursuant to rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(e) "permits a trial court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal based on two general categories of justification: (1) excusable neglect, which is an admittedly neglectful delay that is nevertheless excused by special circumstances; or (2) good cause, which pertains to special circumstances that are essentially beyond a party's control." Reisbeck v. HCA Health Serv. of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48,¶13, 2 P.3d 447. "The discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a [r]ule 4(e) motion is very broad, highly fact dependant, and fundamentally equitable in nature." Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,¶7, 13 P.3d 616.

    Martinez received the district court's final order, waited thirty-one days and only then filed an appeal. When Progressive filed a motion to dismiss, Martinez did not challenge said dismissal. Indeed, at a subsequent oral argument, Martinez's counsel perplexingly agreed that the appeal "was certainly void." The district court did not abuse its broad discretion when it denied the motion for an extension of time. See Reisbeck, 2000 UT 48 at ¶16.

    Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

______________________________

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

______________________________

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge