Glasscock v. State

Glasscock v. State

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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David W. Glasscock,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

State of Utah,

Respondent and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040649-CA
 

F I L E D
(January 13, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 12

 

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Third District, Sandy Department

The Honorable Royal I. Hansen

The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg

Attorneys: David W. Glasscock, Gunnison, Appellant Pro Se

Mark L. Shurtleff, Nancy L. Kemp and Richard L. Musick, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Greenwood.

PER CURIAM:

    David W. Glasscock appeals from two orders issued by the district court. First, Glasscock appeals from a ruling and order issued on July 13, 2004, dismissing Glasscock's petition for extraordinary relief. Second, Glasscock appeals from a ruling and order issued August 17, 2004, disposing of Glasscock's "motion to vacate judgment."(1) This case is before the court on its own motion for summary disposition on the basis that the grounds for appeal are so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings or consideration by the court.

    In 2003, Glasscock sought post-conviction relief in the district court, which the district court interpreted as a petition for relief pursuant to rules 65B(b), 65B(c), and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.(2) Glasscock alleged six claims in his petition: (1) Utah's indeterminate sentence structure was unconstitutional as applied and on its face; (2) the practices of the Board of Pardons--including the power to issue arrest warrants--were unconstitutional; (3) Utah Code section 77-27-21.5 was unconstitutional, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (2003 Supp.); (4) Glasscock's parole conditions were overly burdensome; (5) the State of Utah practices "crime-based discrimination" and (6) the Utah government violates the prohibition contained in the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 4, regarding church domination of a state function.(3)

    The district court dismissed each claim presented by Glasscock as frivolous on its face, save one. The district court reserved Glasscock's claim regarding the parole board's power to issue warrants, as this precise issue was under review by the Utah Supreme Court at the time. The remaining claims were dismissed per a minute entry ruling on February 18, 2003. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(5) ("On review of the petition . . . if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for this conclusion."); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65(C)(g). The district court noted that each of these arguments had specifically been rejected by prior Utah case law, and that the facts stated in his petition failed to state any cause of action.

    On June 29, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 94 P.3d 283. That case presented the question of whether the Utah Constitution "authorized the legislature to enact Utah Code section 77-27-11(3), which empowers the Board of Pardons and Parole to issue warrants to retake parolees believed to have violated parole." Id. at ¶1. The Utah Supreme Court held that it did. See id. at ¶36.

    Based on Jones, the district court ruled that Glasscock's sole remaining claim had no merit, and entered an order dismissing Glasscock's petition for extraordinary relief. The district court also denied Glasscock's motion to vacate the February 2003 order as untimely and without merit. Glasscock appeals from each of these orders.

    On appeal, Glasscock provides this court with no legitimate reason to overturn the rulings of the district court. The district court determined that each claim alleged by Glasscock was frivolous on its face. A petition is frivolous on its face when it appears from the allegations contained in the pleadings and attachments that "the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; [or] the claims have no arguable basis in fact[.]" Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(2)(A), (B); see also Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947-48 (Utah 1994). We conclude that the district court ruled correctly.

    Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Glasscock's petition and the denial of his motion to vacate.

______________________________

Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. Glasscock filed a separate notice of appeal from each order. These appeals have since been consolidated upon Glasscock's motion.

2. Although Glasscock argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted his petition as one for extraordinary relief under rule 65B or 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court appropriately analyzed the petition for its substance, rather than its caption. See DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

3. This court has not overlooked the procedural oddities in this case, including the State's decision to remove and remand, and Glasscock's earlier appeal. Notwithstanding these irregularities, we have determined that we may resolve this case on the merits.