Uintah Auto v. Gardner

Uintah Auto v. Gardner

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Uintah Auto & Homes, Inc.,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Darrell Gardner and Natasha Alred,

Defendants and Appellants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040904-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 17, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 130

 

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Eighth District, Vernal Department

The Honorable John R. Anderson

Attorneys: Darrell Gardner and Natasha Alred, Whiterocks, Appellants Pro Se

Clark B. Allred and Clark A. McClellan, Roosevelt, for Appellee

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Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

    Darrell Gardner and Natasha Alred appeal from the denial of their motion to set aside a default judgment. This case is before the court on Appellee Uintah Auto & Homes, Inc.'s motion for summary disposition and on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition.

    After filing a timely notice of appeal, Gardner and Alred also filed a "Petition for Interlocutory Appeal" in this court. Because the appeal was taken from a final judgment, the petition is both unnecessary and procedurally inappropriate, and we do not consider it.

    The district court did not err in denying the motion to set aside a default judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because there was no default judgment entered in this case. Although a default certificate was entered by the clerk, the district court informed the parties that no default judgment would be entered because Gardner and Alred had filed an answer. Accordingly, there is no merit to the claim that the district court erred in denying the motion to set aside a default judgment because no default judgment has ever existed.

    This case was resolved in the district court by a summary judgment, and Alred and Gardner are mistaken in their characterization of this judgment as a default judgment. The motion was supported by the affidavit of an officer of Uintah Auto & Homes attesting that (1) the used vehicle was purchased by Gardner and Alred on September 30, 2002; (2) Gardner and Alred agreed to pay the purchase price of $3795.50, plus interest; (3) the contract and related documents executed by the parties in connection with the sale described a sale of the vehicle "AS IS-NO WARRANTY"; (4) Alred and Gardner ceased making payments after eleven months; and (5) they owed the amount of $2693.78, plus interest and attorney fees. Gardner and Alred failed to file a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In a letter dated September 14, 2004, the trial court specifically advised Gardner and Alred of the need to file their opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

    In the October 4, 2004 ruling on the summary judgment motion, the district court ruled that Gardner and Alred had admitted the debt and acknowledged that they ceased making payments in their answer and the claim that the clutch was defective was not a defense to liability on the contract. The court noted that they were informed of the need to respond to the motion for summary judgment, but failed to do so. Accordingly, the court held that there were no genuine issues of material fact related to the contract or liability and that judgment should enter as a matter of law. The court further ruled that the motion to set aside judgment and the motion to stay execution were denied because no default judgment had been entered. The district court signed and entered an Order and Judgment on October 13, 2004.

    Even if this appeal is construed as a challenge to the summary judgment, Gardner and Alred have stated no basis for reversal because they failed to oppose the summary judgment and admitted facts sufficient to support the summary judgment.

    For the first time on appeal, Gardner and Alred, who claim to be American Indians, assert that they are immune from suit on the contract. They claim that American Indian individuals "can exercise sovereign authority over and within Indian territory," are immune from suit unless they waive immunity, and have the authority to regulate on-reservation repossession of motor vehicles by off-reservation dealers. However, the case law cited could not stand for the proposition that they are immune from suit on the contract. For example, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998), held that the Indian tribe itself was entitled to immunity from suits on contracts, absent its consent or Congressional authority, pursuant to sovereign immunity. Similarly, Babbit Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 P.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), concerned the authority of the Navajo tribe, not individuals, to regulate on-reservation repossession of vehicles.

    Accordingly, we affirm the Order and Judgment of the district court.

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

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I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge