K.O. v. T.K. (In re G.A.O.)

K.O. v. T.K. (In re G.A.O.)

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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In the matter of the adoption of G.A.O., a minor.

______________________________

K.O.,

Appellant,

v.

T.K. and L.K.,

Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030783-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 17, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 140

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Leon A. Dever

Attorneys: Steven B. Wall, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Candice Ragsdale-Pollock, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

    K.O. (Mother) appeals the trial court's denial of her petition to rescind relinquishment of her parental rights to the infant G.A.O. on the grounds of duress and undue influence. We affirm.

    Generally, "[a] consent or relinquishment of parental rights is effective when it is signed and may not be revoked." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.20 (2002). A relinquishment is revocable by the consenting party only upon a showing that it "was not entered into voluntarily but was induced through duress, undue influence, or under some misrepresentation or deception, or other grounds which would justify release from the obligations of any contract." In re adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Grounds justifying the revocation of consent to adopt must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. See In re adoption of B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99,¶¶23-26, 68 P.3d 1021. We review a trial court's decision on a revocation petition as a mixed question of law and fact, upholding factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous while ensuring that legal standards are articulated and applied correctly. See id. at ¶13.

    To revoke her relinquishment on grounds of duress, Mother must show that her consent resulted from "'(1) . . . an improper threat (2) by the other party (3) that [left her] no reasonable alternative.'" Id. at ¶20 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (1981)) (alterations omitted). The trial court determined that Mother had not demonstrated a lack of reasonable alternatives, in part because there was no compelling evidence that she could not have kept G.A.O. and returned to her prior residence with her own mother. Mother's purported evidence to the contrary was her own opinion that she could not return to her mother's home following an argument that occurred when she left the home and moved in with G.A.O.'s adoptive parents.(1) We cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that Mother failed to demonstrate the absence of reasonable alternatives, or in determining that the availability of alternatives was fatal to her duress claim.

    There is no specific test for determining the existence of undue influence, but rather each case is judged on its own facts and circumstances. See D.P. v. Social Serv. & Child Welfare Dept., 19 Utah 2d 311, 431 P.2d 547, 550-51 (1967) ("Reading of many cases on this subject teaches that each depends upon its own facts[.]" (quotations and citation omitted)). Here, the trial court made specific findings that (1) Mother had discussed adoption with various parties besides the adoptive parents prior to relinquishing her rights; (2) Mother was calm rather than hysterical at the time of the relinquishment; and (3) the language of Mother's relinquishment was unequivocal. The court also noted that, at the time of the relinquishment, Mother had expressly denied being subjected to undue influence. Based on these factors, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that Mother's relinquishment was not the product of undue influence.

    Mother also challenges the trial court's factual findings that she was not under the influence of drugs at the time of the relinquishment and that she discussed the adoption with others. We have reviewed the record and are not convinced that the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. Therefore, we will not disturb those findings.

    The trial court did not err in finding that Mother's relinquishment of her parental rights to G.A.O. was not the product of either duress or undue influence. Accordingly, we affirm the decision below and remand this matter to the trial court for such proceedings as may be warranted by the ongoing circumstances of the parties.

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. Mother's testimony in this regard may have been undercut by her simultaneous testimony that she was back living in her mother's home at the time of the relinquishment hearing.