E.C. v. State (In re C.M.)

E.C. v. State (In re C.M.)

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah, in the interest of C.M., C.M., and R.C.,
persons under eighteen years of age.

______________________________

E.C.,

Appellant,

v.

State of Utah,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20050068-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 31, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 151

 

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Seventh District Juvenile, Price Department

The Honorable Scott N. Johansen

Attorneys: Mckette Allred, Castle Dale, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Carol L.C. Verdoia, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Martha Pierce and Connie Mower, Guardians Ad Litem

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Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Orme.

PER CURIAM:

    E.C. appeals the termination of parental rights in her children. E.C. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings of fact. This challenge is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66,¶11, 21 P.3d 680. In addition, the juvenile court is given a "'wide latitude of discretion as to the judgments arrived at' based upon not only the court's opportunity to judge credibility firsthand," but also based upon the juvenile court's special training and experience regarding such matters. Id. (quoting In re D.G., 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 948, 951 (1962)).

    E.C. argues that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the juvenile court's findings relating to E.C.'s long term drug addiction. E.C. argues that "[i]f it were not for [E.C.'s] brief relapse, she would still have custody of the minor children," and the juvenile court utilized "misplaced reliance" on this relapse to terminate E.C.'s parental rights. This argument ignores the numerous facts of record regarding E.C.'s substance abuse.

    The record reveals that E.C. had a six-year history of substance abuse. E.C. received treatment for her substance abuse on more than one occasion, each time with failed results. E.C. participated in an inpatient program in 1998 and received additional treatment in 2000. Nevertheless, on October 2, 2000, C.M. was born testing positive for cocaine. Indeed, each child at issue in this case was born testing positive for cocaine. After the first removal of the children, E.C. received months of services. Based on certain improvement, the juvenile court returned the children to E.C. Within six weeks of the children's return, E.C. suffered a relapse of drug use, was charged with DUI and child endangerment, was terminated from drug court and jailed, and her children were placed into protective custody a second time.

    Based upon these and related facts, the juvenile court found that E.C.'s substance abuse was a danger to the children, that E.C. "has been unable to conquer her [drug] problem and put the needs of her children first," that she did not internalize the lessons the Division of Child and Family Services tried to teach her, and that she had simply repeated the behavior that led to the removal of the children the first time.

    Sufficient evidence exists to support the juvenile court's findings concerning E.C.'s substance abuse. Further, the juvenile court's factual findings support each of its conclusions that termination of E.C.'s parental rights was appropriate, including: neglect, unfitness, unwillingness or inability to remedy the circumstances that caused the children to be in out-of-home placement, failure of parental adjustment, and repeated refusal or failure to provide proper care. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(1)(b)-(e), (h) (2002).

    Accordingly, the order terminating E.C.'s parental rights is affirmed.

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Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge