Chase v. Jordan School District

Chase v. Jordan School District

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Gregory K. Chase,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Jordan School District, a political subdivision of the State of Utah;
and John Does I-V, individuals,

Defendants and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040575-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 30, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 302

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department, 030912785

The Honorable Tyrone Medley

Attorneys: D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Clifford Petersen, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.

BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:

    Gregory K. Chase appeals the district court's (1) grant of summary judgment to Jordan School District and (2) denial of a motion to amend his complaint. We affirm.(1)

    "Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is nevertheless entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992). "Because the determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate presents a question of law, we accord no deference to the trial court's decision and instead review it for correctness." DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). In addition, a district court's denial of a motion to amend a complaint will not be disturbed "absent an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice." Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT App 355,¶7, 78 P.3d 988 (quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004).

    First, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Jordan School District because Chase's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was insufficient to establish a claim for a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest. Specifically, Chase resigned from his position as a police officer with Jordan School District and the alleged defamatory statement was not made in the course of terminating Chase's employment. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (holding that a psychologist employed by the federal government, who resigned under the threat of termination and then sought other federal employment unsuccessfully because of an alleged defamatory letter from his previous employer, had not stated a claim for the violation of a protected liberty interest); Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1154 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that pursuant to Siegert, the plaintiff had failed to adequately state a claim for the violation of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest because he resigned from a governmental position and was subsequently unable to obtain the government employment he sought, allegedly due to defamatory statements). Accordingly, we hold that summary judgment was proper because Chase failed to assert a claim for the violation of a protected liberty interest.

    Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chase's motion to amend his complaint because the motion was untimely. Under rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, after responsive pleadings have been served, "a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court . . . ; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). In determining whether to allow amendment, "Utah courts . . . consider the following factors . . . : (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party." Atcitty v. Board of Educ., 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Jones, 2003 UT App 355 at ¶16. Here, the district court found that the motion was untimely because (1) it was filed after the court issued its minute order stating it would grant summary judgment to Jordan School District, (2) it was filed eight months after Chase first learned that Clyde Shaw may have made a defamatory statement about him, and (3) Chase could have pursued all of his discovery earlier to obtain information needed to add an additional party. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chase's motion to amend his complaint.

    Accordingly, we affirm.

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Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

1. The State argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Chase's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because the claim is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. In particular, the State contends that governing Utah caselaw holds that school districts are immune from suit in state court because school districts are considered instrumentalities of the state for immunity purposes. See Campbell v. Pack, 389 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1964) ("[S]chool districts are instrumentalities of the state acting in its behalf in educating children and as such partake of its sovereign immunity."). However, since the Campbell decision, the Tenth Circuit, following the United States Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), has held that Utah school districts are not arms of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1993). In addition, since Mt. Healthy, most lower federal courts and state courts have declined to extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to local school districts and boards. Thus, while this issue has not been addressed in Utah since Campbell, in light of the prevailing national view that local school districts are not arms of the state, we choose to reach the merits of this case.