Cecil v. Cecil

Cecil v. Cecil

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Stephanie C. Cecil,

Petitioner and Appellee,

v.

Jason Allen Cecil,

Respondent and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030937-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 10, 2005)
 

2005 UT App 110

 

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Seventh District, Monticello Department

The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson

Attorneys: Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for Appellant

Craig C. Halls, Blanding, for Appellee

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Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.

ORME, Judge:

    We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented are readily resolved under applicable law.

    It is well settled that "[t]rial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the decision is within the confines of legal preceden[ts]." Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Thus, "[t]rial courts have broad discretion in making custody determinations, awarding alimony, and awarding attorney fees. Where the trial court may exercise broad discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of . . . discretion." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).

    We understand Appellant's argument on appeal to be that the trial court went beyond the bounds of sound discretion in reaching the conclusions it did, rather than that the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous given the evidence. In this posture, we take the trial court's findings of fact as our starting point.

    Given all of the court's findings, including not only the formal written findings but also the court's explanations from the bench, we are not convinced that the trial court exceeded the bounds of sound discretion as concerns any of the central issues raised on appeal. The trial court's decision on each of these issues reveals no manifest injustice or inequity. Rather, the court's findings of fact show that the trial court duly considered the evidence Appellant points to on appeal but found other evidence more important or more credible.

    For example, on the issue of imputed income, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found he was voluntarily underemployed and imputed his annual income at $41,500, instead of setting the amount according to his present income as a stocker at Wal-Mart. Appellant contends that the court disregarded several circumstances that have affected his ability to earn an income at the level the court imputed, e.g., stress and related health concerns that impede him from working again as a Wal-Mart manager. He asserts these same reasons compelled him to step down as an assistant manager and to take a position as a stocker, making his decision to take a reduction in pay reasonable.

    Contrary to Appellant's argument, the trial court did not wholly ignore these circumstances and their effect on Appellant's earning capacity. Indeed, the trial court agreed that Appellant's problems with stress made him incapable of working as a manager at Wal-Mart. At the same time, the trial court's findings of fact show that the court was simply not persuaded that these circumstances prevented Appellant from being successful as an assistant manager at Wal-Mart or that these circumstances forced him to work only as a stocker. These determinations are well within the sound discretion of the trial court since the trial court is in an advantaged position to weigh the evidence, determine the persuasive value of the evidence, and make determinations based on the evidence. See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). The trial court entered detailed findings of fact, which adequately support the court's decision to impute income to Appellant at the level it did.

    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment except in one respect. On the issue of attorney fees, we reverse and remand to the trial court. While in the context of divorce "[t]he decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court," the court must "base the award on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). "Failure to consider these factors is grounds for reversal on the fee issue." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Moreover, [s]uch an award must be based on sufficient findings regarding these factors." Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44,¶18, 19 P.3d 1005 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original). "This enables an appellate court to determine if the trial court has abused its discretion. Without adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate review." Willey, 951 P.2d at 230.

    While the record shows that there is some evidence that the amount of the attorney fees was reasonable, the trial court did not specifically make all the required findings in awarding Appellee attorney fees. See Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Here, the trial court merely ordered Appellant to pay Appellee's attorney fees after determining that Appellee would be awarded alimony. In fact, it appears that the court presumed that because Appellee met all the requirements to merit an award of alimony, she also deserved an award of attorney fees. This is essentially the position urged by Appellee on appeal, although she couches it more in terms of a request that we simply apply the alimony findings to the attorney fee determination.

    However, just because the trial court properly concluded that Appellee met all the requirements to merit an award of alimony does not necessarily mean that she simultaneously qualifies for an award of attorney fees. Instead, the court must give an explanation for requiring one spouse to bear the other spouse's attorney fees. Otherwise, the absence of such an explanation prevents meaningful appellate review of the trial court's ruling. See Wilde, 969 P.2d at 444. Also, determining the propriety of an award of attorney fees in this case necessitates, as a practical matter, a separate needs/ability analysis. In other words, Appellee's need for help with the fees, as well as Appellant's ability to pay the fees, must be analyzed in light of the alimony awarded. Thus, the trial court must make specific factual findings regarding the award of attorney fees and reconsider its decision in light of those
findings, adjusting its decision if appropriate. We remand for that limited purpose.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge