Wood v. Wood

Wood v. Wood

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 

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Karen Wood,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Colleen Wood, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood,

Defendant and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030159-CA
 

F I L E D
(September 30, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 343

 

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Seventh District, Castle Dale Department

The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday

Attorneys: Andrew B. Berry Jr., Moroni, for Appellant

Michael K. Black, Provo, for Appellee

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Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

    Karen Wood appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood (the Estate). We affirm.

    Our analysis of Karen Wood's appeal turns on the effect of the 1987 divorce decree that terminated her marriage to Raymond D. Wood (the Decedent). Karen Wood argues that the decree did not dissolve her joint tenancy interest in certain property (the Property) that was purchased by Karen Wood and the Decedent during their marriage; consequently, the trial court erred in refusing to quiet title in her name. "'We interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation.'" Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12,¶18, 973 P.2d 431 (quoting Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Consequently, so long as the language of the decree is not ambiguous, we look to its plain language to determine its effect. See Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 1999 UT 89,¶13, 987 P.2d 48 ("If the contract is written and the language employed is not ambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the language.").

    When a trial court presides over a divorce proceeding it is empowered to distribute property as equity demands, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2003), including disposing of property that was once jointly held by the parties. See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980) ("The trial court is empowered to make such distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel such conveyances as are necessary to that end."); Mathie v. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779, 784 (1961) ("[T]here can be no doubt of the court's prerogative to make whatever disposition of the property . . . as it deems fair, equitable and necessary[.]"); cf. Gaskie v. Hugins, 640 P.2d 248, 249 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) ("[When] there is no separation agreement which can be read as an expression of the intent of the parties regarding the survivorship characteristic, the intent of the trial court in its order distributing the marital assets is determinative."); Lutzke v. Lutzke, 361 N.W.2d 640, 652 (Wis. 1985) ("Whether a divorce judgment has the effect of terminating [joint tenancy] is dependent upon either the expressed intent of the parties, usually revealed by [pre-judgment] stipulation or by the intent of the divorce judge.").

    Paragraph five of the 1987 divorce decree states:

That the marital assets be divided between the parties as follows:

A. To [the Decedent]: The 1974 mobilehome and the [Property], and subject to the indebtedness thereon; the 1984 Daytona automobile, subject to the indebtedness thereon; the 1975 Dodge four-wheel drive pickup truck; the 1978 fifthwheel camp trailer; the Century boat; the 1982 Honda ATC three-wheeler; the dirt bike; the snowmobile; and a portion of the furniture and furnishings.

B. To Plaintiff: The 1978 Subaru automobile; a portion of the furniture and furnishings; Plaintiff's personal belongings and those of the minor children.

C. That Plaintiff shall and hereby is granted Judgment against Defendant in the amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00), the same being approximately one-half of the equity in those items outlined herein as being awarded to Defendant. Said Judgment shall earn interest at the statutory rate until paid in full.

By its plain language, the decree gave the Decedent complete ownership of the Property, subject to any preexisting debt. To balance the distribution, the court entered a money judgment of $10,000.00 to Karen Wood--an amount that the divorce court described as approximating one-half of the equity value of the property awarded to the Decedent. Consequently, the order issued by the divorce court not only severed any joint tenancy interest that Karen Wood may have had in the Property, it also eliminated any ownership interest she otherwise might have retained in the property and instead ordered the Decedent to pay her $10,000.00. As a result, Karen Wood has no valid ownership claim to the Property and the trial court properly granted the Estate's summary judgment motion on this issue.(1)

    Notwithstanding Karen Wood's argument, the stipulation that she and the Decedent entered into, which was later adopted by the divorce court, does nothing to alter our conclusion. "[W]hen contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous," the agreement is subject to trial court interpretation on a motion for summary judgment. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986); Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980) ("Where possible, the underlying intent of a contract is to be gleaned from the language of the instrument itself; only where the language is uncertain or ambiguous need extrinsic evidence be resorted to. . . . [T]he mere fact that the parties urge diverse definitions of contract terminology does not, per se, render it ambiguous."). Through the stipulation, Karen Wood agreed to forego litigation to collect the $10,000.00 judgment debt owed to her by the Decedent, and place with her attorney an executed quitclaim deed to the Property to be delivered after she received the final payment. In return for this security, the Decedent agreed to pay Karen Wood a total of $5,600.00. Consequently, rather than renewing their previous joint tenancy status over the Property, the stipulation instead recognizes that Karen Wood had a secured debt that the Decedent pledged to pay. The stipulation had no impact on the effect of the parties' divorce decree, and the trial court properly discounted its impact on the quiet-title action.

    Finally, Karen Wood complains that this case and the probate of the Decedent's estate were improperly consolidated. Trial courts have been granted broad discretion in deciding the outcome of motions to consolidate or bifurcate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 42; Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30,¶5, 996 P.2d 565. Here, the trial court granted the Estate's motion to consolidate the quiet title action with the ongoing probate because the disposition of the Property was an issue in both cases and the court deemed it judicially economical to consolidate. However, the record demonstrates that the cases were not actually consolidated. Rather, the quiet-title action was merely transferred to the judge overseeing the probate matter. It retained its original case number, and was decided as a case separate from the pending probate. Consequently, Karen Wood's complaint that the case was improperly consolidated with, and decided under, the probate case is without merit.

    Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of the Estate.(2)

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. Karen Wood also complains that the Estate's motion was supported by affidavits not based upon personal knowledge. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). However, the Estate submitted no affidavits in support of its motion, relying instead upon documents that were subject to legal interpretation. Thus, her argument is misplaced.

2. The Estate asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal because it was awarded fees in the probate matter. However, because this appeal arises from a case separate and apart from the probate case, and fees were not awarded in this action below, the Estate's request for fees is denied.