Raiser v. BYU

Raiser v. BYU

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Aaron Raiser,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Brigham Young University,

Defendant and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030517-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 10, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 199

 

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Fourth District, Provo Department

The Honorable Guy R. Burningham

Attorneys: Aaron Raiser, Fresno, California, Appellant Pro Se

Erik G. Davis, Provo, for Appellee

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Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

Aaron Raiser appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his complaint, which alleges violations of a previous settlement agreement for claims against Brigham Young University (BYU), pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm.

Raiser complains that BYU breached its settlement agreement with him in several significant ways. The trial court examined Raiser's claims in light of the language of the parties' 1999 settlement agreement, and found that each of those claims attempted to expand the effect of the agreement beyond the parties' intent. "'If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law.'" Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109,¶12, 62 P.3d 440 (quoting WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,¶19, 54 P.3d 1139).

Raiser challenges the trial court's dismissal of his breach of contract claim. The trial court found that the clear and unambiguous language of the prior settlement agreement did not include a provision mandating immunity from police scrutiny--or as claimed by Raiser, police harassment. The trial court ruled that BYU's only obligation under the settlement agreement was to allow Raiser to audit classes, which it has done. This court agrees with the trial court's reading of the contract. Accordingly, the dismissal of Raiser's breach of contract claim was proper.

Raiser argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his claims that BYU breached its obligations related to good faith and fair dealing. A party's obligations under a contract "cannot be enlarged and expanded by means of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to include other promises not fairly included in the promise actually made." Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency, 951 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1997). BYU promised nothing more than to allow Raiser to audit classes. This promise does not fairly include or imply unfettered access to all areas of the campus at all hours of the day or night, or limitations upon BYU's police or security officers' authority to supervise or restrict Raiser's use of BYU's campus or facilities. The trial court properly dismissed Raiser's good faith and fair dealing claim as an impermissible attempt to expand BYU's contract obligations.

Similarly, the trial court dismissed Raiser's misrepresentation claim arising from statements allegedly made by BYU, or its agents or representatives, that police harassment of Raiser would cease as of the signing of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement, as stated above, does not contain any such representation. As to alleged contemporaneous oral representations, the settlement agreement contains the following integration language: "This agreement is the sole agreement between the parties relating to claims against one another and all other agreements written or oral are void." In the absence of any ambiguity in the substantive portion of the agreement, the trial court correctly found that alleged extra-contractual statements could not affect the parties' rights or responsibilities under their integrated agreement. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) (applying the parol evidence rule "to exclude evidence of prior or contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract"). The trial court, therefore, properly dismissed this claim.

We affirm the trial court's dismissal of Raiser's complaint. BYU seeks attorney fees pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, which requires this court to award "just damages" upon a finding that an appeal is "frivolous." Utah R. App. P. 33(a). A frivolous appeal "is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b). While we find no merit in Raiser's pro se appeal, it is not so lacking in legal basis as to be frivolous. Accordingly, BYU's request for attorney fees is denied.

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge