Pimentel v. DWS & Lifetime

Pimentel v. DWS & Lifetime

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Carlos A. Pimentel,

Petitioner,

v.

Department of Workforce Services, Workforce Appeals Board; and Lifetime Products, Inc.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20040064-CA
 

F I L E D
(May 13, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 160

 

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Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Carlos A. Pimentel, Ogden, Petitioner Pro Se

Suzan Pixton, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Workforce Appeals Board

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Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

    Carlos Pimentel seeks judicial review of a decision disqualifying him from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. The case is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition.

    An individual is ineligible for unemployment benefits when he or she is discharged for "just cause." Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(2)(a) (2001). Factors to be considered in determining whether just cause exists are culpability, knowledge, and control. See Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202. "An agency's application of law to its findings of fact will not be disturbed unless its determination 'exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.'" Johnson v. Department of Employment Sec., 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted).

    The determination that Pimentel was discharged for just cause is reasonable and rational. Pimental accumulated five attendance occurrences within a six-month period that resulted in being placed on probation pursuant to a written probation agreement. The agreement, dated March 25, 2003, stated that any further violation of the attendance policy would be grounds for immediate termination. Pimentel admitted that he knew he was required to contact his supervisor if he was going to be absent, and he also knew that because he was on probation for attendance occurrences, any unapproved absence could result in his termination. Pimentel had control to either return to work as scheduled or to call in and speak with his supervisor. Even assuming that his car problems were beyond his control, he was not prevented from calling his supervisor. Disregard of the employer's requirements to appear for work or inform a supervisor of his absence is culpable, particularly where the incident was not isolated and was the culminating violation in a progressive disciplinary system. At the hearing before the administrative law judge, Pimentel did not dispute the validity of any of the attendance occurrences that resulted in his probationary status. The final absence without permission violated that agreement and resulted in termination.

    Under these circumstances, the Board's determination that just cause existed for Caldwell's discharge is reasonable and rational. We affirm the Board's decision.

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Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge