Little v. Davis County

Little v. Davis County

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Melody Little,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Davis County,

Defendant and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20021039-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 18, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 71

 

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Second District, Farmington Department

The Honorable Michael G. Allphin

Attorneys: James R. Hasenyager and Peter W. Summerill, Ogden, for Appellant

Linette B. Hutton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Melody Little (Plaintiff) appeals from the trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment in favor of Davis County (Defendant). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred when it found that Plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act), Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp. 2003),(1) because she failed to direct her notice of claim to the Davis County clerk and because she failed to set forth her damages, to the extent they were known, in her notice of claim.

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,(2) "'this Court will view the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and will allow the summary judgment to stand only if the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.'" Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247,¶8, 53 P.3d 2 (citation omitted). Furthermore, "[i]nterpretation of the Immunity Act is a 'question of law which we review for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court's determinations.'" Id. at ¶9 (citations omitted).

It is well settled that "'suit may not be brought against the state or its subdivisions unless the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act are strictly followed.'" Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16,¶11, 40 P.3d 632 (quoting Hall v. Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34,¶23, 24 P.3d 958). Applying this rule of strict compliance, the Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly denied recourse to parties that have even slightly diverged from the exactness required by the Immunity Act." Wheeler, 2002 UT 16 at ¶12; see, e.g., Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25,¶6, 69 P.3d 1287 (holding that plaintiff who sought to sue Salt Lake County "did not strictly comply with the Act by delivering his notice of claim to a county commissioner"); Wheeler, 2002 UT 16 at ¶16 (holding that notice of claim submitted to Kane County commissioners "failed to strictly comply with the Act's requirement that [plaintiffs] direct and deliver their notice of claim to the Kane County clerk"); Brown v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 15,¶¶1-5, 40 P.3d 638 (holding that notice of claim sent to defendant's claims department did not comply with Act's requirement that notice of claim be sent to defendant's governing board); Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,¶¶5, 17, 37 P.3d 1156 (same).

In this case, Plaintiff initiated a claim against Davis County for injuries she allegedly sustained when she fell on the sidewalk outside the Davis County Courthouse. The Act requires that a "person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity . . . shall file a written notice of claim with the entity." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2). The Act further requires that when a claim is against a county, "[t]he notice of claim shall be . . . directed and delivered" to the county clerk. Id. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(B) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order to strictly comply with the Act, Plaintiff was required to direct her notice of claim to the Davis County clerk.

Plaintiff does not dispute that her notice of claim was not addressed to the Davis County clerk.(3) Plaintiff nonetheless insists that her notice of claim was "directed" to the Davis County clerk because a Davis County court employee was served with a copy of that notice.

When interpreting a statute, "we first look to the plain language of the statute." State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217,¶7, 73 P.3d 978. In so doing, we "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Only when a statute is ambiguous are other methods of statutory construction considered. See id.

In this case, the Act's notice requirements are plain and unambiguous. Prior to maintaining an action against a county, a plaintiff must file a written notice of claim, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2), and that notice of claim must be "directed and delivered to" the county clerk. Id. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(B). Although the term "directed . . . to" is not defined by the Act, in this context, it is commonly understood to mean "addressed to."(4) Had the legislature intended the term to encompass delivery, as Plaintiff argues, it would not have included a separate delivery requirement. See id. Therefore, by serving a clerk's office employee with her notice of claim, without addressing it to the county clerk, Plaintiff failed to strictly comply with the Act's explicit mandate that the notice of claim be "directed . . . to the county clerk." Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment.(5)

Affirmed.

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge

1. Although this statute has been amended since Plaintiff initiated her claim, that amendment does not affect the outcome in this case. Therefore, for ease of reference, we cite to the most recent version of the statute.

2. Because matters outside the pleadings were considered by the trial court, the trial court's order was technically an order granting summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,¶2, 37 P.3d 1156.

3. Plaintiff's notice of claim was addressed only to Davis County, the Davis County Attorney, the State of Utah, and the Utah Attorney General.

4. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines "direct" as, "to mark with the name and address of the intended recipient." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 358 (9th ed. 1986).

5. Because we conclude that Plaintiff's claim fails on the basis that her notice of claim was not directed to the Davis County clerk, we need not consider whether the trial court erred when it also found that Plaintiff's notice of claim did not clearly set forth her damages to the extent they were known.