Jackson v. Friel

Jackson v. Friel

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Lawrence M. Jackson,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

Clint Friel,

Respondent and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20031047-CA
 

F I L E D
(May 6, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 155

 

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Eighth District, Vernal Department

The Honorable A. Lynn Payne

Attorneys: Lawrence M. Jackson, Gunnison, Appellant Pro Se

Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

Lawrence Jackson appeals the trial court's summary judgment dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. This is before the court on its own sua sponte motion for summary disposition on the basis that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings and consideration by this court. See Utah R. App. P. 10(e).

Jackson pleaded guilty to rape of a child, a first degree felony, in 1998, and was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life in May 1999. After sentencing, Jackson filed both a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and an appeal. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the plea. Jackson did not appeal the denial of his motion. This court affirmed Jackson's sentence on appeal, and the Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Jackson filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He asserted numerous claims that are roughly in three categories: challenges to his plea, challenges to his sentence, and pre-plea constitutional violations.

Utah Code section 78-35a-106 states that a person is not eligible for post-conviction relief on any ground that "was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal," or that "could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(1)(b), (c) (2002). A petition for post-conviction relief "is not a substitute for, or a second chance at, appellate review." Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,¶14, 44 P.3d 626. Allegations of error that were known or should have been known to a petitioner at the time of judgment must be raised and appealed through the normal process, "or the judgment becomes final and is not subject to further attack, except in unusual circumstances." Id. at ¶15. "To demonstrate unusual circumstances, a petitioner must show that there was an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). This applies to all claims, "including constitutional questions." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,¶5, 43 P.3d 467.

Jackson's claims regarding his plea and his sentence are barred under Utah Code section 78-35a-106. Jackson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied and not appealed. Any issues related to his plea raised in his current petition are thus barred because they could have been raised in his motion to withdraw his plea in the trial court or on appeal. Similarly, claims relating to his sentence were either already appealed, or could have been included in his appeal of his sentence, and are likewise barred.

Jackson's alleged pre-plea constitutional violations are also waived. By pleading guilty, Jackson is "deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including pre-plea constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989).

Jackson asserts that he raised material facts sufficient to preclude summary judgment, and that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the summary judgment motion prior to ruling on his motion for discovery. However, because Jackson's claims are barred as a matter of law, there is no purpose served by permitting discovery.

Therefore, the dismissal of the petition is affirmed.

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Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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William A. Thorne Jr, Judge