State v. Anderson

State v. Anderson

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

David L. Anderson,

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030215-CA
 

F I L E D
(April 29, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 129

 

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Third District, West Valley Department

The Honorable Stephen L. Roth

Attorneys: Catherine E. Lilly and Joel Jonathan Kittrell, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

David E. Yocom and Robert G. Neill, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Greenwood, Orme, and Thorne.

ORME, Judge:

We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record[,] and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented are readily resolved under applicable law.

"In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under rule 403, we will not overturn the court's determination unless it was an 'abuse of discretion.'" State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). Thus, we must determine "whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence

outweighs . . . its probativeness' was beyond the limits of reasonability." Id. at 239-40 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 n.3 (Utah 1991)).

We do not necessarily agree with the trial court's determination that the prison disciplinary decision was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. However, even if the prison disciplinary decision was relevant, we cannot say it "was beyond the limits of reasonability" for the trial court to conclude that the potential for confusing the jury substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence. For this reason, we decline to disturb the trial court's determination not to admit the evidence. See Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40.(1)

The trial court found that admitting the findings of "another tribunal, not governed by the same rules or the same standards of evidence that we have here" could have substantially prejudiced the jury. Admission of this evidence had the "potential to confuse or mislead the jury because the introduction of a collateral issue may cause the jurors to 'lose sight of the main events on which they should focus.'" Jensen v. IHC Hosps., 2003 UT 51,¶113, 82 P.3d 1076 (citation omitted).

Under the due process provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions, a "'defendant[ is] afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"(2) State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984)). However, this is not an unlimited right, but rather it must "bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046 (1973). Defendant's due process right to present his defense was not violated by the exclusion of evidence of the
prison disciplinary hearing and the findings made by the disciplinary board.

Affirmed.

______________________________

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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I CONCUR:

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1. Additionally, Defendant argues that the prison disciplinary board's findings should have been admitted under rules 803(6) and 803(8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court specifically stated that, despite the fact the evidence could otherwise be admitted as a business record, it would still be inadmissible given its irrelevance and, more importantly, its potential for misleading and confusing the jury. Similarly, even though the trial court did not explicitly state whether the evidence was admissible as a public record, this argument is inconsequential given the trial court's analysis under rule 403.

2. Nothing in this decision should be taken to suggest that if a witness at the criminal trial testified differently than at the prison disciplinary hearing, evidence from the hearing would not be admissible at the criminal trial for impeachment purposes. See Utah R. Evid. 613(b) (governing the use of extrinsic evidence to prove a trial witness's prior inconsistent statement).