Christensen v. Santamaria

Christensen v. Santamaria

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

----ooOoo----

Christensen Chevrolet-Buick-Geo, Inc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Jose Santamaria dba R-Kars, Inc., and Freedom Ford; R-Kars, Inc., a Utah corporation; and Freedom Ford-Mercury, Inc., a Utah corporation,

Defendants and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020446-CA
 

F I L E D
(February 5, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 15

 

-----

Fourth District, Provo Department

The Honorable Claudia Laycock

Attorneys: D. David Lambert and Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for Appellant

Ralph C. Amott, Provo, for Appellees

-----

Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Greenwood.

BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:

Christensen Chevrolet-Buick-Geo, Inc. (Christensen) appeals from a final judgment of dismissal in favor of Jose Santamaria, doing business as R-Kars, Inc. and Freedom Ford (Santamaria). We affirm.(1)

For several years prior to the filing of this suit, Christensen and Santamaria had a long-standing business relationship involving the purchase and sale of used vehicles at wholesale. However, in April 1999, a payment dispute erupted. Christensen claimed it delivered, but never received payment for, four vehicles and matching titles. Santamaria insisted he paid for the vehicles. Christensen filed suit and the case was tried to the bench. At the close of evidence, the trial court ruled in favor of Santamaria and dismissed Christensen's cause of action.

According to Christensen, the trial court erroneously required Christensen to prove nonpayment by a preponderance of the evidence. When Christensen failed to do so, Christensen claims the trial court ruled in favor of Santamaria. To support its argument, Christensen points to statements the trial court made in ruling for Santamaria. In the trial court's written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of dismissal, the trial court wrote:

[T]he court finds that [Christensen] has not met its burden of proof, namely a preponderance of the evidence.

. . . .

[T]he preponderance of the evidence standard has not been met by [Christensen].

We disagree with Christensen's contention that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to Christensen. In its ruling from the bench, the trial court stated:

I see a very[,] very long history here of many purchases, all of which were paid for [by Santamaria.]

. . . .

The most persuasive to me is the fact that in hundreds of transactions through the years [Santamaria] has always paid, the cars have been delivered to him, and he has received title for them.

. . . .

I find it hard [to believe] that . . . [Christensen] would have allowed [Santamaria] to walk away with titles by mistake on four cars sold during the 12 day period.

Nothing in the trial record supports Christensen's claim that the trial court improperly shouldered Christensen with the burden to prove nonpayment. To the contrary, after Christensen put on evidence of nonpayment, Santamaria countered with circumstantial evidence that he did pay for the vehicles. The trial court was persuaded that Santamaria proved payment by a preponderance of the evidence.

In cases like this one, where the evidence is in dispute, "[t]he trial court [must] judge the credibility of [the] witness[es]." Reliance Ins. Co., v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah 1993). Because the trial court is better positioned to judge the credibility of a witness, Utah appellate courts "afford deference to the lower court['s]" credibility determinations. Id. Here, the trial court determined that Santamaria was the more credible witness. We find no justification for disturbing the trial court's credibility determination in this case. Thus, we affirm.

______________________________

Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

-----

WE CONCUR:

______________________________

Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

______________________________

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. A review of the law and motion file reveals that Santamaria filed a motion for summary dismissal of this appeal based, inter alia, on grounds that Christensen's notice of appeal was untimely filed by a non-lawyer corporate representative and is, therefore, void and subject to dismissal. In our October 18, 2002 order, we denied the motion for summary dismissal and deferred "a ruling on the issues raised therein . . . pending plenary presentation and consideration of the case[,]" pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(f). In its brief, Santamaria again urges us to dismiss the appeal on these grounds.

    Our review of the record reveals that the notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the thirty-day deadline outlined in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Christensen timely filed the notice of appeal pro se on May 30, 2002, and paid the required filing fees and bond. On June 20, 2002, licensed counsel filed an appearance and represented Christensen throughout the appeal. Santamaria has provided no evidence to indicate the pro se filing, followed by an entry of appearance of licensed counsel, prejudiced Santamaria in any way. Based on the foregoing, we reach the merits of the instant appeal.