State v. Bowen

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State v. Bowen

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Lonnie M. Bowen,

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20030053-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 10, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 195

 

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Fourth District, Fillmore Department

The Honorable Donald J. Eyre Jr.

Attorneys: James K. Slavens, Fillmore, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme.

DAVIS, Judge:

Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly allowed the testimony of a police detective, whose testimony regarding Defendant's criminal activities had not been disclosed to Defendant, to rebut the testimony of Defendant's alibi witnesses whom the trial court allowed to testify despite late notice to the State. Defendant, however, fails to argue how his knowledge of the detective's testimony would have changed the outcome of his case, or what he would have done differently with this information had he received it prior to jury selection. In this instance, Defendant fails to show that the trial court's ruling "led to a 'likelihood of prejudice,'" State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5,¶48, 20 P.3d 271 (citation omitted), and therefore any claimed error must be regarded as harmless. See id. at ¶¶48-49.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine him about a letter he wrote to the trial court because the State never disclosed the existence of the letter during discovery, a violation of rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. A trial court is generally allowed broad discretion in its discovery rulings, however, "'[t]he proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the trial court's decision for correctness.'" State v. Spry, 2001 UT App 75,¶8, 21 P.3d 675 (citations omitted). In State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,¶¶23-24, 989 P.2d 52, the defendant argued that the State had violated rule 16 because it did not disclose to the defendant his admission to a former cellmate that he had used a .38 caliber gun to kill a woman, and therefore, the trial court should not have allowed the cellmate to testify. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating:

The absurdity of this argument is apparent if we simply rephrase it as follows: [the defendant] argues that because the State failed to inform him that he and [his cellmate] had been in a serious altercation while in prison together, his lawyers failed to move the court to exclude [his cellmate's] testimony or adequately cross-examine him. However, as the State has pointed out, [the defendant] himself obviously knew that Ross had been his cellmate and that he and [his cellmate] had been in an altercation; the State had no obligation to so inform him.

Id. at ¶24. Similarly, the State in this case had no obligation to inform the Defendant of what he had written and sent to the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court properly allowed the State to cross-examine Defendant about the letter.

Affirmed.

______________________________

James Z. Davis, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

______________________________

Judith M. Billings,

Presiding Judge

______________________________

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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