Blevins v. Custom Steel (Amended)

Blevins v. Custom Steel (Amended)

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Steven Blevins and Debra Kay Blevins,

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.

Randy Isaacson; Linda Isaacson; Jason Bishop; Wendy Garamendi; Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc.; et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION1
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020177-CA
 

F I L E D
(August 5, 2004)
 

2004 UT App 265

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Leon A. Dever

Attorneys: Michael A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellants

Steven Blevins and Debra Kay Blevins, Salt Lake City, Appellees Pro Se

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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Greenwood.

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Randy and Linda Isaacson, Jason Bishop, and Wendy Garamendi (collectively, Defendants) appeal from two orders of the trial court. We reverse and remand.

Defendants make two arguments on appeal. First, Defendants argue that the trial court's decision to reduce their attorney fees, incurred as a result of defending a breach of contract action, was unsupported by findings of fact. Second, Defendants argue that the trial court's decision to deny them additional attorney fees, incurred in pursuing enforcement of their initial award of attorney fees, was likewise unsupported by findings of fact.

"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). However, "although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award must be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact." Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207,¶9, 984 P.2d 392 (quotations and citations omitted). Specifically, in determining an award of reasonable attorney fees, trial courts are required to answer the following four questions:

1. What legal work was actually performed?

2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?

3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services?

4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, this court has made it clear that a trial court "'abuses its discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees] requested unless the reduction is warranted' by one or more of the above factors." Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting that trial court erred because it reduced, without explanation, the prevailing party's attorney fees).

In this case, the trial court determined in its first order that Defendants' initial request for attorney fees was "reasonable." However, without providing any explanation or making any findings of fact, the trial court then reduced the fees sought by Defendants from $11,538 to $6050. Although Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from a local attorney stating that Defendants' attorney fees should not exceed $7000, it is not clear from the trial court's order that this was the reason for the reduction in the amount of fees awarded. Similarly, the trial court's decision to deny Defendants' request for additional attorney fees, incurred in enforcing the original judgment, was unsupported by any findings of fact. In its second order, the trial court noted only that the additional fees requested were "unreasonable."

Based on the foregoing, the trial court's reduction in Defendants' initial award of attorney fees and its subsequent denial of Defendants' request for additional attorney fees constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we remand for the entry of findings of fact consistent with this decision, and if appropriate, for an adjustment in the amount of attorney fees awarded to Defendants by the trial court. Moreover, because the fee-shifting provision of the settlement agreement entered into by the parties also allows for the recovery of attorney fees incurred on appeal, we award Defendants reasonable attorney fees incurred as a result of this appeal in an amount to be determined by the trial court on remand.

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Russell W. Bench,

Associate Presiding Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge

1. This Amended Memorandum Decision replaces the Memorandum Decision in Case No. 20020177-CA issued on June 10, 2004.