State of Utah v.Rushton

State of Utah v.Rushton

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Matthew Rushton,

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20020154-CA

F I L E D

(February 6, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 25

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Robin W. Reese

Attorneys: Catherine E. Lilly and Lisa J. Remal, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Bench.

BENCH, Judge:

Defendant argues that the testimony of police officers regarding telephone calls they received from an individual, who identified himself as Defendant, should have been subject to the reliability analysis required for eyewitness identifications. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-84 (Utah 1991) (applying a reliability analysis to facts involving a victim eyewitness who had seen a masked perpetrator for a brief time and at some distance); see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986) (discussing scientific research documenting the unreliability of eyewitness testimony).

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by "failing to conduct a more searching inquiry" into the telephone calls reported by police, and, therefore, his due process rights were violated. We disagree. The facts of this case do not support Defendant's argument. Officers Wright and Blackmer both received a telephone call via their direct private numbers from someone who identified himself as Defendant. Both officers testified as to the content of their respective telephone conversations, including why they believed that the caller was Defendant. The officers did not specifically identify Defendant, but merely reported what happened during the course of their investigation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a more searching reliability analysis like that found in Ramirez and its progeny. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-84.

Furthermore, even if we were to view the officers' testimony as voice identification evidence, the concerns that led the supreme court to require a reliability analysis for eyewitness identification evidence are not present in this case. See id. at 779-80. Defendant cites to part of our opinion in State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292,¶18, 13 P.3d 604, arguing that the alleged "voice identification implicates the same concerns as eyewitness identifications." Id. However, just as in Silva, the case before us "does not present such a situation" where the same reliability concerns as found in eyewitness identification are present. Id. Accordingly, Defendant's due process rights were not violated. See id. at ¶19.

Next, Defendant argues that the trial court "erred in admitting the evidence under Rule 901 since there was insufficient evidence to link the calls to [Defendant]." Rule 901 states in relevant part, "[t]he requirement of authentication . . . as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(a). The State presented evidence of self-identification, nervous laughter, and the receipt of phone calls via private phone lines along with other contextual evidence. In light of the evidence presented, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the phone call evidence. See Silva, 2000 UT App 292 at ¶11 (applying an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court's admission of evidence under rule 901).

We have considered Defendant's remaining arguments and determine them to be without merit. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992) (permitting appellate courts to decline to
analyze and address in writing every issue raised). Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

Judith M. Billings,

Associate Presiding Judge