Rousseau v. Adamson

Rousseau v. Adamson

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Monica Rousseau,
Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

Kenneth Glenn Adamson and Janet Leah Adamson,
Respondents and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020358-CA
 

F I L E D
(August 7, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 281

 

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Second District, Farmington Department

The Honorable Rodney S. Page

Attorneys:
Monica Rousseau, Clearfield, Appellant Pro Se
Kenneth Glenn Adamson and Janet Leah Adamson, Appellees Pro Se

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Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

Appellant Monica Rousseau appeals from a trial court order granting Kenneth Glenn and Janet Leah Adamson monthly visitation privileges with B.R. We affirm.(1)

It is well-established that a party "who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising an issue for the first time on appeal." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).(2) In this case, the parties, through a stipulation, agreed to the outcome reached by the trial court and none of the parties voiced any objection to the content of the stipulated agreement. Thus, Rousseau's issue is unpreserved, and Rousseau has no avenue of relief in the courts of appeal. Instead, Rousseau's proper avenue for relief, should she desire to modify her agreement with the Adamsons, lies either (1) in an attempt to renegotiate with the Adamsons concerning the material elements of the agreement, or (2) in a petition to the trial court for relief from the judgment or for a modification of the custody and visitation order. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 60 ("Relief from Judgment or Order"); Utah R. Juv. P. 47 ("Reviews and Modifications of Orders").

Accordingly, we dismiss Rousseau's appeal and affirm the trial court order granting the Adamsons visitation privileges to B.R.

______________________________

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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I CONCUR:

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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ORME, Judge (concurring in the result):

I agree affirmance is in order. I wish, however, to distance myself from one aspect of the court's decision. It is untenable to coach Appellant on the steps she can take to avoid the effects of the stipulation she entered into. It is one thing to observe that Appellant might have been better served by engaging an attorney to give her legal advice; it is quite another to ameliorate the effects of that decision by giving her legal advice of our own. That is not the court's role. More importantly, we do not serve the interests of the parties--in particular the child--in helping to prolong this controversy by pointing out how it can be renewed in a different forum.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. Neither party's brief comports with the expectations of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or with our expectation that the legal arguments be reasonably developed and supported with properly cited authority. See Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,¶¶8-9, 995 P.2d 14. Thus, it is clear that both parties would have been well-served consulting with legal counsel, or by carefully reading rule 24, prior to submitting their briefs to this court.

2. While there are exceptions to this general rule, Rousseau does not argue that any of the exceptions apply, nor does she recognize the general rule. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing plain error, exceptional circumstances, and ineffective assistance of counsel as the only recognized exceptions to the preservation rule). Thus, we do not address the applicability of the exceptions to the rule, and instead deny Rousseau's claim as unpreserved.