Market Reps Inc. v. Workforce Appeals Board

Market Reps, Inc. v. Workforce Appeals Board

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Market Reps, Inc.,
Petitioner,

v.

Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020622-CA
 

F I L E D
(July 10, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 244

 

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Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Mark J. Kohler, Cedar City, for Petitioner

Suzan Pixton, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

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Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

Market Reps Inc. (Reps) appeals from a decision of the Workforce Appeals Board (Board), concluding that Lori Lancaster, a terminated employee, had not been terminated for cause, thereby determining Lancaster to be eligible for unemployment benefits. We affirm.

This court "shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, [we] determine[] that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by" the agency's erroneous interpretation or application of the law, by "an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute," or by a decision that is "arbitrary or capricious." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), -(h)(i), (iv) (1997). Because the Legislature has granted the Board a degree of discretion in making benefits decisions, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 35A-4-405 (2001), we review the Board's decisions for reasonableness. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec., 854 P.2d 570, 573-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (applying the reasonableness standard); see also Professional Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec., 953 P.2d 76, 77 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the current version of the statute addressing eligibility for benefits is substantially the same as its previous legislative incarnations). Furthermore, "'[t]his court grants great deference to an agency's findings, and will uphold them if they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court."'" Albertsons, 854 P.2d at 574 (citations omitted).

Reps argues that the Board's decision was unreasonable, and arbitrary and capricious. To establish "just cause" for a termination, an employer is required to demonstrate that the employee was (1) culpable for the conduct leading to termination, (2) had knowledge that the conduct was proscribed, and (3) was in control of the situation. See id. at 573. If the employer fails to demonstrate the existence of any one of these three elements, the termination will have been made without just cause, and benefits will be awarded to the employee and charged to the employer. See id. at 573-74. In the instant case, Reps does not contest the Board's factual findings, rather, Reps argues that Lancaster knew the rules, was culpable in her conduct, and was in control of the situation. Essentially, Reps argues that Lancaster could have met the requirements with sufficient effort and the proper attitude.(1) We are, however, unpersuaded by Reps's argument.

The Board, after adopting the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) findings as its own, awarded Lancaster benefits based upon its conclusion that

[f]or one of the weeks at issue, the claimant was absent for [reasons] beyond her control, and therefore could not meet her sales quota. Another week was soon after the holidays and customers complained to the claimant that they could not buy her product as they had no money after Christmas. The Board finds that the weight of the evidence shows that the claimant tried to [meet] the employer's requirements, but could not due to external factors [that] she could not control.(2)

Thus, the issues of knowledge and culpability are not properly before this court. Concerning the issue of control, the Board found that (1) Lancaster had been ill during the relevant period, affecting her ability to meet Reps's productivity standard; and (2) the economic conditions surrounding her termination were material and adversely affected Lancaster's ability to meet Reps's productivity standards. Thus, the Board concluded that Lancaster's failure to meet Reps's productivity standards resulted not from behavior in her control, but rather from "external factors she could not control."

Relying on the unchallenged findings of the Board, we conclude that it was reasonable for the Board to determine that Lancaster's failure to meet Reps's standards was caused by factors beyond her control. Thus, the Board's decision to award Lancaster benefits, and charge them to Reps, was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious, as argued by Reps.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Board.

______________________________

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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WE CONCUR:

______________________________

Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

______________________________

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. Reps did attempt to challenge the findings at oral argument, however, in failing to contest the findings in its brief, Reps effectively waived its opportunity to argue against the findings. Cf. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1260 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("As a general rule, an issue raised in a reply brief will not be considered on appeal.").

2. While the board adopted the ALJ's findings, it crafted its own conclusions based upon these findings.