Joos v. Joos

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Dan Rodney Joos,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Piper C. Joos (Monte),
Defendant and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20011005-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 12, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 186

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Tyrone Medley

Attorneys: Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.

ORME, Judge:

After nearly seven years of litigation, including a panoply of unsuccessful appeals to this court, the Utah Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court, Appellant once again urges us to strike down the entirety of Utah's divorce laws as "void, unconstitutional and unenforceable."(1) We previously declined this invitation in an unpublished decision. See Joos v. Joos, 1999 UT App 312, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 822, 121 S. Ct. 66 (2000).

Ostensibly as justification for the current appeal, Appellant advances the startling proposition that our divorce law jurisprudence, as well as Title 30 of the Utah Code, were "overruled" by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion). We have read Troxel, and not even the most fanciful interpretation of that case comports with the meaning suggested by Appellant.

Troxel invalidated a Washington nonparental visitation statute because it unconstitutionally "infringe[d] on the fundamental right of [the respondent-parent] to make child rearing decisions." Id. at 72-73, 120 S. Ct. at 2064. Wary of the potential implications of its decision, the Court unequivocally limited the holding of Troxel to its facts, stating: "We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. . . . [Rather,] the constitutional protections in this area are best 'elaborated with care' . . . on a case-by-case basis." Id. (citation omitted). Given this explicit pronouncement, together with Troxel's otherwise obvious inapplicability to Utah's divorce laws, we can only conclude that the argument Appellant strains to make is utterly frivolous. See Utah R. App. P. 33(b) (defining "a frivolous appeal" as "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law").

Likewise, we have considered Appellant's other claims, e.g., that the trial judge was guilty of "gender bias" and that he violated Appellant's "religious liberty[,] due process and equal protection" rights, and found them to be entirely without merit. Therefore, we decline to address them further. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992) (stating that appellate courts need not "analyze and address in writing every issue or claim raised").

Appellee received an award of attorney fees below and requested attorney fees on appeal. Consistent with well-established precedent, that request is granted. See, e.g., R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1997); Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).

We remand for the award of attorney fees incurred by Appellee on appeal. Otherwise, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. In the underlying divorce action, the commissioner ordered that Appellant "not file any more motions or pleadings . . . unless they were screened first . . . and authorize[d by him]." Undeterred, Appellant evidently filed a new lawsuit. A similar injunction was issued by the trial court in the instant case "precluding [Appellant] from filing any further frivolous actions . . . which involve issues that have already been decided." The Utah Supreme Court has condemned "oppressive litigation tactics," including "pursuing and seeking remedies after all relevant legal issues have been settled," because such tactics "waste court resources and require opponents to spend a great deal of money in defense thereof." R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1081 n.10 (Utah 1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted).