Orem City v. Jeppson

Orem City v. Jeppson

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Orem City,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Jason Jeppson,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020403-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 19, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 206

 

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Fourth District, Orem Department

The Honorable John Backlund

Attorneys: Randall T. Gaither, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Justin C. Johanson, Orem, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Orme.

JACKSON, Presiding Judge:

Jason Jeppson challenges his conviction of one count of misdemeanor child abuse. Jeppson argues that the trial court erred in denying his mid-trial motion to dismiss for failure to present a prima facie case. Jeppson further argues that the trial court erred in denying his post-judgment motion to arrest judgment. We affirm.

Jeppson first contends that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence of either his intent to strike A.H. or of any injury that A.H. received from the blows. We disagree.

Where the trial court rejects a defendant's claim that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence regarding elements of a charge, an appellate court will affirm the trial court's decision "if 'the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that] some evidence exists from which a reasonable [fact finder] could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280,¶6, 988 P.2d 452 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989) (alterations in original)); see also State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,¶8, 988 P.2d 949.

We have reviewed the record in the present case and conclude that the prosecution met its burden of bringing forth prima facie evidence regarding the elements of the charge. Regarding the intent element, the prosecution presented testimony from multiple sources that indicated that Jeppson was "angry" when he struck A.H. This testimony was supported by Jeppson's assertions to an officer at the scene that he felt that A.H. and his siblings were disrespectful toward him, that they were habitually disobedient to his instructions, and that relations between them were strained. Moreover, according to the prosecution's evidence, the present incident was not one of a solitary, reflexive blow, but was instead one in which Jeppson got up from his chair, reached across the table, and struck A.H. on the head three separate times. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that Jeppson intentionally struck A.H.

Regarding the injury element, the prosecution presented evidence indicating that A.H. complained of pain to his head over a half hour after the incident. Given the apparent causation between the incident at the table and A.H.'s complaints of head pain, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have determined that Jeppson's blows injured A.H., and we accordingly affirm the trial court's denial of Jeppson's motion to dismiss.

Jeppson next challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to arrest judgment, again arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.

The burden on a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is heavy. Defendant "must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack."

State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106,¶11, 999 P.2d 1252 (citation omitted).

By omitting multiple pieces of material evidence that were unfavorable to his position, Jeppson failed to satisfy the marshaling requirement. For example, Jeppson challenges the trial court's finding that he intentionally struck A.H., yet fails to acknowledge such crucial details as the fact that A.H. told investigators that Jeppson was angry, and not joking, when he struck him at the table; the fact that T.J. told investigators that Jeppson struck A.H. after becoming upset (and not as a joke as Jeppson contends); and the fact that Jeppson himself told investigators that the children were often disrespectful toward him. With regard to the question of whether Jeppson struck A.H. with an open or closed fist, Jeppson fails to mention that A.H. told investigators that he had been struck by a closed fist. We conclude that such material omissions constitute a clear failure to satisfy the marshaling requirement. Accordingly, because Jeppson failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, we assume that the record supports the findings, see Medical Prods. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998), and thus affirm the trial court's denial of Jeppson's motion to arrest judgment.

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Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge