State of Utah v. Hughes

State v. Hughes

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Jeffrey Leon Hughes,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20010617-CA
 

F I L E D
(March 13, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 71

 

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Fourth District, Provo Department

The Honorable Gary D. Stott

Attorneys: Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme.

DAVIS, Judge:

Appellant Jeffrey Leon Hughes appeals his convictions of theft by receiving stolen property, speeding, and driving on a suspended license.

First, Hughes argues that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the charge of receiving stolen property for insufficient evidence. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim,

we will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted."

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,¶18, 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). To examine the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, we must first analyze the language of the receiving stolen property statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999). "When interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the plain language of the statute." Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66,¶8, 44 P.3d 835.

Section 76-6-408 states that a person is guilty of receiving stolen property if he "receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, [or] withholds . . . the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (emphasis added). The terms of this statute are disjunctive; thus, any one of them can constitute criminal conduct. See State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the disjunctive term "or" between terms in a statute "delineates alternative ways a defendant triggers the [statute]").

Accordingly, the State did not need to establish that Hughes knew the vehicle was stolen at the time he initially received it to support a conviction under section 76-6-408. The plain language of section 76-6-408 allows for conviction if Hughes knew that the vehicle was stolen property at any time that his conduct was covered by section 76-6-408. There was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that Hughes retained or withheld the vehicle from its owner while knowing that it was stolen property--albeit stolen by Hughes rather than by a third party.

Second, Hughes argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to amend the information from receiving stolen property to unauthorized control of a motor vehicle. To establish plain error, "the appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). "If any one of these requirements is not met, plain error is not established." Id. at 1209.

"[W]hen an individual's conduct can be construed to be a violation of two overlapping statutes, the more specific statute governs." State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1984). However, this rule applies only if the defendant's conduct is "fully covered by both a general and a specific statute." State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309,¶42, 989 P.2d 1091.

The plain language of the receiving stolen property statute and the unauthorized control of a motor vehicle statute shows that they proscribe different criminal conduct. See Roseto, 2002 UT App 66 at ¶8 (holding that "this court looks first to the plain language" when interpreting a statute). The receiving stolen property statute states that a person must act with the "inten[t] to deprive the owner" of his or her property, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1), which is defined more specifically as the intent to "withhold property permanently." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3)(a) (1999) (emphasis added). In contrast, the unauthorized control of a motor vehicle statute states that a person must act with "the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-1314(1) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). Because one statute covers the intent to permanently deprive an owner of property and the other covers the intent to temporarily deprive an owner of property, the trial court did not err by refusing to amend the information from receiving stolen property to unauthorized control of a motor vehicle.

We conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss the charge of receiving stolen property on the basis of insufficient evidence. We also conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to amend the information from receiving stolen property to unauthorized control of a motor vehicle. Therefore, we affirm.

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James Z. Davis, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Judith M. Billings,

Associate Presiding Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge