Haase v. Ashley Valley Medical Center et al

Haase v. Ashley Valley Medical Center et al

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Lori Haase,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-appellee,

v.

Ashley Valley Medical Center, Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center, and John Does 1 through 10,
Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-appellants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20020524-CA

F I L E D
(July 17, 2003)

2003 UT App 260

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Eighth District, Vernal Department

The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby

Attorneys: Douglas G. Mortensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Robert R. Harrison and David W. Slagle, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

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Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Davis.

JACKSON, Presiding Judge:

Appellant Lori Haase appeals the trial court's judgment pursuant to its interpretation of a special verdict form. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for the trial court to enter judgment of $820,000, plus statutory interest, in accordance with the jury's true intention.

The hospital asserts that the trial court erred in responding to a mid-deliberation question from the jury without notifying counsel. It argues that it is entitled to a new trial

under rule 47(o) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.(1) Rule 47(o) provides:

After the jury have retired for deliberation, . . . if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or stated on the record.

"'The language of rule 47(o) seems to require notification of the attorneys only when the jury is conducted into the courtroom in the presence of the judge.'" Bearden v. Wardley Corp., 2003 UT App 171,¶11, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (quoting Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 1271 (Utah 1997)). In the present case, the jury sent its question to the judge and received his reply without being conducted into the courtroom. Thus, the judge was not obligated to notify counsel prior to his reply.(2)

Additionally, neither the record nor the briefs indicate that the hospital objected to the judge's mid-deliberation communication with the jury. It is well established that "issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal . . . unless the petitioner demonstrates that plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances exist." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1,¶41, 63 P.3d 731 (quotations and citations omitted) (omission in original). The hospital does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances and therefore fails to demonstrate that it is entitled to a new trial under Rule 47(o) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Central to Haase's appeal is the trial court's entry of judgment against the weight of affidavits and testimony of the jurors regarding their intent. Haase correctly asserts that Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, 48 P.3d 218, is controlling

in this case. In Bishop, the jury was asked to apportion fault among three parties, including the plaintiff (Bishop), and determine general and special damages. See id. at ¶5. The trial

court then subtracted Bishop's fault and entered judgment accordingly. See id. At least three of the jurors later signed affidavits explaining that they had already subtracted the plaintiff's fault in calculating the general and special damages. See id. at ¶6. Based on these affidavits, Bishop moved to amend the jury verdict pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), arguing that the error was clerical rather than judicial, thus appropriate for post-verdict correction rather than a new trial. See id. The trial court denied Bishop's motion, and on appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment according to the true intent of the jury. See id.

We conclude the facts of the present case are indistinguishable from the facts in Bishop, and thus apply the supreme court's analysis to the facts of this case. Like the jury in Bishop, the Haase jurors were asked to perform calculations of both damages and apportionment. Both juries filled out special verdict forms that were interpreted by the trial courts to indicate other than their true intent because each trial court misunderstood the meaning of each jury's apportionment of fault. Jurors from both juries later signed affidavits indicating that in completing their respective special verdict forms they did not intend the court to use the juries' apportionment of fault to reduce the damages they had specified. Thus, the error involved here was clerical, and the trial court erred in disregarding the true intent of the jury.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for the trial court to enter judgment of $820,000, plus statutory interest, in accordance with the jury's true intent.(3)

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Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Judith M. Billings,

Associate Presiding Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge

1. The hospital actually cites rule 47(n) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in 2003, rule 47 was amended and rule 47(n) was renumbered as 47(o). See Utah R. Civ. P. 47.

2. Although not required, it is good practice to notify counsel prior to responding to a jury inquiry.

3. Haase and the hospital each challenge several evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Because of our ruling on appeal, we do not address Haase's evidentiary challenges. Regarding the hospital's evidentiary challenges, it fails to demonstrate prejudice. "[E]ven where error is found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all of the evidence presented at trial, it appears that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached." Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80,¶8, 977 P.2d 508 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Utah R. Evid. 103(a).