Dayton v. Dayton

Dayton v. Dayton

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Patricia L. Dayton,
Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

Douglas D. Dayton,
Respondent and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20010889-CA
 

F I L E D
(June 19, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 205

 

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Second District, Ogden Department

The Honorable Roger S. Dutson

Attorneys: Robert A. Echard, Ogden, for Appellant

Douglas D. Dayton, Queen Creek, Arizona, Appellee Pro Se

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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Greenwood.

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Patricia Dayton (Wife) appeals from the trial court's Judgment and Decree of Divorce, arguing the trial court erred in failing to enforce the parties' settlement agreement, dividing the marital property, and refusing to grant her attorney fees. While we affirm the trial court's refusal to uphold the settlement agreement, we remand for specific findings on the property division and attorney fees.

Wife claims the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to uphold the settlement agreement made with Douglas Dayton (Husband) and stipulated to on the record, concerning the division of their marital property. This court reviews a trial court's decision to modify a stipulated division of property in a divorce action for abuse of discretion. See Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1983).

[I]t is well recognized that a parties' stipulation as to property rights in a divorce action, although advisory and usually followed unless the court finds it to be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessarily binding on the trial court. It is only a recommendation to be adhered to if the court believes it to be fair and reasonable.

Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

In this case, the stipulation was entered into after Wife testified that she had no knowledge of the location of specific property. When Wife later disclosed, contrary to her previous testimony, that she had sold some of the property, the trial court determined that this disclosure was sufficient to reject the agreement. Implicit in the court's refusal to enforce the stipulation was its belief that the stipulation was "unfair or unreasonable," id., and should therefore be set aside.(1) Consequently, the rejection of the agreement was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.

Next, Wife argues the trial court's division of the marital estate was inequitable. In Utah, marital assets should be divided equally, absent exceptional circumstances. See Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239,¶22, 987 P.2d 603 (stating "each party is presumed to be entitled to . . . fifty percent of the marital property" (quotations and citations omitted)).

"[W]hen one of the parties to a property distribution raises a serious question as to the value of one or more of the assets, the trial court's distribution of those assets should be based upon written findings of fact that will permit appellate review." Where the trial court fails to do so . . . the appropriate remedy is to remand for necessary factual findings.

Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985)).

In this case, both parties questioned the value of the property. However, we cannot determine from the Findings of Fact whether the distribution of the marital assets was equitable. "'[T]he court's division of the estate cannot stand undisturbed when we are not presented with sufficient findings to demonstrate that the court's ruling comports with established law.'" Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The findings in this case are insufficient because values were not assigned to the assets and the amount of the parties' debt is not clear.(2) Therefore, we remand to the trial court for "specific, detailed findings supporting its financial determinations," id. at 1021, and adjustments to the property division, if appropriate, once the valuation is complete.(3)

Lastly, Wife argues the trial court erred when it refused to award her attorney fees. "The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the trial court must base the award on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44,¶18, 19 P.3d 1005 (quotations and citations omitted). This court has also held that "[s]uch an award must be based on sufficient findings." Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41,¶22, 974 P.2d 306.

In this case, the trial court's Findings of Fact simply state, "[E]ach party will be responsible for their own attorney[] fees and Court costs." This conclusary statement does not allow "'meaningful appellate review.'" Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44 at ¶18 (quoting Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997)). Although Wife had requested attorney fees, the trial court failed to enter findings as to why such an award was not appropriate. "'[U]nless the record "clearly and uncontrovertedly supports" the trial court's decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court.'" Id. (quoting Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Therefore, we remand to the trial court to make detailed findings as to entitlement to attorney fees. Wife does not request attorney fees on appeal.

In sum, we affirm the trial court's decision not to enforce the settlement agreement, as it was not an abuse of discretion. However, we remand to the trial court for the necessary findings on the property division and attorney fees.

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge

1. Additionally, Wife's disclosure undermined the meeting of the minds required for a settlement agreement. See Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds of those involved."), superseded by statute on other grounds by Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys., Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 586, n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

2. It is particularly difficult to determine whether the assets were equitably divided because Husband was ordered to pay off the parties' debts through the sale of specific property. However, once the debts were paid, Husband was permitted to keep any remaining property. The trial court gave no reason for this division, which makes a determination of the amount of the property award difficult, if not impossible.

3. We note that the trial court's award to Husband of "all the work related equipment in order to generate income" is not an abuse of discretion.