Daday v. R.D. Logging

Daday v. R.D. Logging

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Richard S. Daday,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

R.D. Logging Co., Inc.,
Defendant and Appellee.
 

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20010430-CA
 

F I L E D
(April 24, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 125

 

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Fifth District, St. George Department

The Honorable G. Rand Beacham

Attorneys: Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Appellant

Brent M. Brindley and Bryan J. Pattison, St. George, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Orme.

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Daday appeals the trial court's denial of his claim for overtime benefits under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the FLSA). See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1998). Specifically, Daday claims that his only burden was to prove a prima facie case, and it is undisputed that he did so. Daday also appeals the trial court's refusal to reopen the record to admit an answer to an interrogatory he failed to submit during his case in chief. We affirm.

It is undisputed that the FLSA applies to R.D. Logging, and that R.D. Logging violated provisions of the FLSA by failing to keep records of Daday's work hours. See 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 (2002). Where no accurate records exist, an employee bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case "proving that he performed work for which he was not properly compensated. . . . The burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence." Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687-88, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (1946). It is also undisputed that Daday presented a prima facie case, shifting the burden of proof to R.D. Logging.

R.D. Logging presented evidence to rebut Daday's prima facie case. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Daday does not contest the trial court's findings of fact. Accordingly, this court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. See Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1997). The trial court concluded that Daday's "testimony regarding his working of more than forty hours per week is speculative, it fails to account for the time he took for smoking breaks and worked on personal projects rather than for R.D. Logging, and is contradicted by more credible evidence." This conclusion is based on the court's factual findings.(1) Most tellingly, the trial court found Daday's testimony to be "speculative, unsubstantiated, and unreliable" and "rebutted by more credible evidence."

"Trial courts are accorded great discretion in determining factual matters. They are in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole." Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Utah 1996). Given that Daday does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, he cannot now contend that his testimony was credible, contrary to the trial court's findings. We therefore find no error in the trial court's conclusion that R.D. Logging rebutted Daday's prima facie case by presenting evidence that negated "the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence." Anderson, 328 U.S. at 688, 66 S. Ct. at 1192.

Next, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to reopen the proceedings in order for Daday to offer an interrogatory response into evidence. "A motion to reopen to take additional testimony when a case has been submitted to the court, but prior to the entry of judgment, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976). In this case, the circumstances indicate that Daday had "ample opportunity" to introduce the interrogatory into evidence during the course of the trial, id., but chose not to. Also, admitting the evidence would have necessitated providing R.D. Logging with an opportunity to rebut it. We thus see no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of Daday's motion to reopen.

We affirm the decision of the trial court.

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. The court's findings include the following:

14. Daday spent significant time on personal work . . . during the normal hours of the shop; for example, Daday built furniture to exchange for his own automotive repairs and built doors to trade for his own countertops.

15. Daday also parked his own travel trailer next to R.D. Logging's shop, and worked on the reconstruction and remodeling of its interior during the normal work hours of R.D. Logging's shop; witness Carnley testified that he saw improvements made by Daday to his trailer which would have required three or four complete weeks of work to accomplish, and others of R.D. Logging's employees who testified had witnessed Daday working on his trailer during the normal work hours of the shop.