State v. Christen

State v. Christen

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Brandon Christen,

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020712-CA
 

F I L E D
(December 26, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 440

 

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Fourth District, Provo Department

The Honorable Gary D. Stott

Attorneys: Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.

ORME, Judge:

Any error in the photo array and/or the victim's in-court identification of Defendant was harmless given the additional overwhelming evidence inculpating Defendant, including the distinctive clothing found at his bedside. See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989) ("The standard for reversal in cases involving an erroneous failure to exclude [evidence] is whether absent the error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant."); State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("'Erroneous admission of evidence is harmless if there is convincing, properly admitted evidence of all essential elements of the case.'")(citation omitted), cert. denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994).

It is generally permissible under rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, to inquire into prior felony convictions "[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness." But "[w]hen, as here, the prior conviction is for the same type of crime involved in the matter under present consideration . . . the probative value of the evidence as affecting the party's credibility will rarely outweigh the resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and the prejudice to the party." Terry v. Zions Coop. Merc. Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 325 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds by McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). The trial court was within the range of permitted discretion under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in concluding that the prejudicial effect of admitting the circumstances of Anderson's conviction would substantially outweigh any probative value the details might provide. See generally State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d 783, 786-87 (Utah 1977).

"A trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, and we will not reverse a trial court's decision absent clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998). While we agree the State should have been more frank with the trial court and Defendant's counsel about the inducements extended to Anderson in exchange for his testimony,(1) we disagree that this case is akin to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972). There, "the [g]overnment's case depended almost entirely on [one witness's] testimony; without it there could have been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the jury," and his "credibility as a witness was therefore an important issue in the case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it." Id. at 154-55, 92 S. Ct. at 766. In contrast, Anderson was not the sole witness connecting Defendant to the crime. Moreover, Anderson's credibility was already thoroughly damaged when he misidentified Defendant at trial, denied that he spoke to the prosecutor about the misidentification, and admitted he was himself a convicted felon. In any event, the important witness was not Anderson, but rather Anderson's mother. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial.

"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal 'only if "the cumulative effect of . . . several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had."'" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,¶56, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)) (alterations in original). Given the overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt, any errors committed in this case, even when considered cumulatively, do not
undermine our confidence in the essential fairness of his trial and conviction.

Affirmed.

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. We disagree that a reversal in this case is the only way to remedy any misrepresentations made by the State's trial counsel. Any such misrepresentations would be ethical violations readily addressed by the Utah State Bar's disciplinary procedures.