Tippett v. Sanpete Co.

----ooOoo----

Wayne S. Tippett,
Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

Sanpete County,
Respondent and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20020270-CA

F I L E D
June 20, 2002 2002 UT App 216 -----

Sixth District, Manti Department
The Honorable David L. Mower

Attorneys:
Wayne S. Tippett, Manti, Appellant Pro Se
Mark L. Shurtleff and Mark E. Burns, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion pursuant to rule 10(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tippett asserts that the district court improperly dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging extradition to South Carolina to complete the remaining twenty-one years of his twenty-five year sentence.

"Interstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. The Clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial arrest and trial." Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288, 99 S. Ct. 530, 535 (1978) (internal citations omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-20 (1999) ("The guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which he is charged in another state may not be inquired into."); Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1046-47 (Utah 1985) ("[T]he inquiry into participation in the underlying crimes goes to the merits of the charge in the demanding state and is beyond the ambit of the asylum state's interest in the matter.").

The United States Supreme Court has clearly defined the limited scope of judicial review permitted in a habeas corpus petition challenging extradition. [A] court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifiable. Doran, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S. Ct. at 535. Because Utah, as the asylum state, may not inquire into the guilt or innocence of the accused, Tippett's request for discovery from South Carolina was beyond the scope of the habeas corpus proceeding in Utah.

Tippett argues that the district court erred in finding the extradition papers were facially correct because he is not currently charged with the crime of escape in South Carolina. However, there is no dispute that Tippett has been charged with, and convicted of, the underlying offenses that are the subject of the extradition. Tippett concedes that he "left" the Oaklawn Correction Facility in Greenville, South Carolina before he completed his sentence.

The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA), codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-30-1 to -28 (1999), "ensures that 'the demanded person's due process rights are safeguarded.'" Boudreaux v. State, 1999 UT App 310,¶24, 989 P.2d 1103 (quoting State v. Phillips, 587 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. 1998)). In compliance with UCEA, the South Carolina governor's demand for extradition contained all the necessary documents, including a "statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-3. Thus, because Tippett had already been convicted, and failed to complete his sentence in the demanding state, South Carolina did not need to charge him with another crime to extradite him. SeeWalker v. United States, 775 A.2d 1107, 1109 (D.C. 2001) ("[A]ppellant 'overlooks the fact that he has already been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the demanding state for the crime which forms the basis of the extradition request.'" (Quoting Lykins v. Steinhorst, 541 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995))).

The Governor of South Carolina certified that the extradition documents are authentic. "This is a sufficient compliance with the law as to the authentication." Birmingham v. Larson, 26 Utah 2d 414, 490 P.2d 893, 894 (1971). The Governor of Utah, once presented with the authentic documents from the demanding state, properly issued a rendition warrant. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-2 (stating "it is the duty of the governor" to extradite fugitive upon proper demand); Boudreaux, 1999 UT App 310 at ¶9. "A governor's warrant is presumed valid, and '[a] governor's grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met.'" Boudreaux, 1999 UT App 310 at ¶24 (quoting Doran, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S. Ct. at 535); accord Emig, 703 P.2d at 1047. Tippett failed to rebut the prima facie case established through issuance of the Utah governor's warrant. See Emig, 703 P.2d at 1047-48 ("To prevail at the hearing on this petition, [Petitioner] had to carry the burden of refuting the prima facie case of fugitivity that had been established through issuance of the Utah governor's warrant."). Consequently, once the district court found that all the Doran factors had been met, including the finding that Tippett has already been convicted of a crime in South Carolina, it properly dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Finally, Tippett contends that Utah violated state law and denied him due process and equal protection. Tippett bases this argument on his contention that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-29-5 to -11 (1999), applies to his extradition case. However, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers applies only to "detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5. Because Tippett's extradition is based on his conviction, rather than an untried charge, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is inapplicable. See State v. Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151, 1152 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we grant the sua sponte motion, affirm the district court's dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and order Tippett's immediate extradition to South Carolina.
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge
 
 

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge