State of Utah v. Mondragon

----ooOoo----

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Keith I. Mondragon,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20000551-CA

F I L E D
October 10, 2002 2002 UT App 329 -----

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Judith S. Atherton

Attorneys:
Edward K. Brass, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for Appellee -----

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.

ORME, Judge:

Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Specifically, Defendant alleges that ineffective assistance by his counsel rendered his guilty pleas involuntary.

"The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12,¶14, 26 P.3d 203. The usual test for evaluating ineffective assistance claims "applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must first show "that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988). See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984) ("[T]he defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.").

Essentially, Defendant argues that he was involuntarily induced into pleading guilty because of direct and indirect pressure from his prior counsel, who was unprepared for trial. Defendant alleges, inter alia, that his counsel failed to investigate facts, interview defense witnesses, accept Defendant's collect telephone calls, or meet with Defendant more than twice outside of court.(1)

Despite Defendant's allegations, the record suggests that Defendant's counsel's reluctance to proceed to trial was based on his observation of the 11-year-old victim's testimony at Defendant's preliminary hearing and the potential penalties facing Defendant. Defendant has failed to overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance" or that "under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164 (1955)). The trial court found that even if Defendant was "pressure[d]" to plead guilty, the court spent a "great deal of time" making sure Defendant understood the implications of a guilty plea and even "took a recess" so Defendant could consider the matter further.

Even if Defendant's counsel exaggerated somewhat the potential maximum sentence that Defendant faced absent a plea bargain,(2) Defendant received a "meaningful benefit in exchange for [his] guilty plea[, which] is an additional indication that counsel acted reasonably in advising the defendant to accept the plea." State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 317 (Utah 1998).

Defendant has failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. Accordingly, Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel's assistance was so ineffective as to render his pleas involuntary.

Affirmed.
 
 

______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. As further evidence of his counsel's lack of preparation, Defendant relies on his counsel's statement, made the week before trial, that he was "nervous." The trial court found that counsel's statement was more properly attributed to counsel's apprehension about the potential penalties facing Defendant should he be convicted.

2. Even though counsel overstated the maximum penalty on one count, the trial court found that counsel's representations regarding Defendant's possible sentence, should he be convicted, were "quite accurate."