State of Utah v. Gardner

----ooOoo----

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Bryan Gardner,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20011024-CA

F I L E D
November 29, 2002 2002 UT App 404 -----

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis

Attorneys:
Stephen R. McCaughey, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff, and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee -----

Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Greenwood.

BENCH, Judge:

Statements taken in violation of the Miranda warnings are generally not admissible. See generally Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2416-17 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). However, "police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question," but only to those in police custody. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977). Defendant argues that his interview with Officer Allen constituted a custodial interrogation under Miranda, and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Defendant also argues that the initial interview with Detective Stringfellow was coercive in nature and led to the custodial interrogation with Officer Allen.

"'Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him in custody.'" State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S. Ct. at 714) (internal quotations omitted). The record and Defendant's brief on appeal both indicate that custody was an issue raised below by the State in response to Defendant's Motion in Limine. Accordingly, we begin our analysis by determining whether Defendant was in custody.(1)

The Utah Supreme Court has identified four factors that should be considered in determining whether Defendant was in custody. See State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). Based on these factors, Defendant was not in custody during the initial Stringfellow interview: (1) Defendant was interviewed at the public safety building; (2) Stringfellow told Defendant that she was investigating the allegations but had not yet concluded whether any crime had been committed; (3) Defendant was not placed under arrest before, during, or immediately after the questioning; and (4) the interview was relatively brief and Stringfellow told Defendant that he was "under no obligation to be here . . . if you ever feel uncomfortable . . . you're free to stand up and walk out the door any time you want."

In similar fashion, the Miranda warnings were unnecessary for the interview with Officer Allen because Defendant was not in custody. Defendant went voluntarily to the police station for this interview. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S. Ct. at 714 (stating that "[n]or is the requirement of [Miranda] warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect"). Although the investigation focused on Defendant, this alone does not equate to custody. See id. Defendant was never placed under arrest. He stayed at the police station for a relatively brief time and was free to leave at any time. Allen told Defendant he did not "have to talk to me . . . there's the door [i]f you don't feel comfortable here, you can leave at anytime [sic]." See Snyder, 860 P.2d at 355 (stating "'the proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest"'" (citations omitted)).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Miranda warnings were unnecessary for either interview because Defendant was not in custody. See State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291,¶¶12-13, 55 P.3d 1158. Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that Defendant was in custody, Defendant voluntarily waived his rights. Finally, based on our review of the record, neither interview was coercive. SeeState v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147 n.2. Defendant was not "threatened, coerced, or promised anything in exchange for his statement[s]; the statements were made on [Defendant's] own initiative." Id.(2)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress.
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge
 
 

______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. Although the trial court below did not address the issue of whether Defendant was in custody and therefore entitled to receive the Miranda warnings, we "may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995).

2. We find no merit in Defendant's contention that the "Stringfellow interview had a coercive effect that carried over to the Allen interview." See State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 1993) (concluding that a coercive interview did not cause the defendant to involuntarily confess two and one-half days later). In the instant case, although neither interview was coercive, more than a week passed between the Stringfellow and Allen interviews.