St. George City v. Brown

----ooOoo----

St. George City,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

David Brown,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20010655-CA

F I L E D
January 31, 2002 2002 UT App 20 -----

Fifth District, St. George Department
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham

Attorneys:
David Brown, Hurricane, Appellant Pro Se
Jonathan L. Wright and Larry M. Meyers, St. George, for Appellee -----

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thorne.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant David Brown appeals convictions of Driving on a Denied License, Interference with a Public Servant, and No Proof of Insurance following a trial de novo in district court on an appeal from the Washington County Justice Court. This case is before the court on the court's own motion and on appellee's motion for summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

"The judgment after trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (Supp. 2001). "By enacting [section 78-5-120] the Utah Legislature . . . specifically and intentionally limited the issues that may be appealed from a district court's judgment." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Accordingly, "absent an issue regarding the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, the decision of the district court is final and this court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal thereof." Id. at 277.

Brown did not challenge, and the district court did not rule on, the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. Brown's docketing statement challenged only the evidentiary basis for his convictions. Based upon a review of the trial court record and the transcript of the bench trial, there is no basis for this court's jurisdiction over the appeal under section 78-5-120.

Brown responded to the motions to dismiss by contending that section 78-5-120(7), which limits appellate jurisdiction over cases originating in justice court, is unconstitutional. This issue was not raised, or ruled upon, in the district court and cannot be considered by this court on appeal. In addition, the constitutionality of the procedure for appeals in justice court cases was determined in City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court stated that substantially similar procedures limiting the right of appeal in justice court cases "have existed since statehood," and the provision allowing trial de novo on appeal from a justice court satisfies the guarantee of an appeal contained in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 519. These provisions have limited further appeal to those circumstances where constitutionality of a statute or ordinance was adjudicated in the trial de novo. See id. at 516-17.

Brown requests this court to transfer the appeal as "improperly filed" in an appellate court that lacks jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Had this appeal satisfied the prerequisites of section 78-5-120, the appeal would be within this court's subject matter jurisdiction. We deny the request for transfer because the appeal was not filed in the wrong appellate court.

Because the appeal presents no issues that are within the scope of this court's appellate jurisdiction, the decision of the district court is final under section 78-5-120. We accordingly dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge
 
 

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William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge