Winder v. Winder

----ooOoo----

Ivan Winder,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Brenda Kay Winder,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 981764-CA

F I L E D
April 6, 2000
  2000 UT App 96 -----

Seventh District, Moab Department
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson

Attorneys:
Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for Appellant
William L. Schultz, Moab, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.

BENCH, Judge:

Appellant argues the trial court erred in its property division. Specifically, appellant asserts that the trial court should have: (1) awarded her some interest in appellee's trailer home; and (2) given her some of the furniture appellee made during their marriage. We disagree.

Appellant and appellee came into the marriage with separate trailer homes. In the decree of divorce, appellant and appellee were "awarded their own residence free and clear of any claim by the other party, subject to its indebtedness." Appellant acknowledges that "the general rule is that a party should receive property that he or she brought into, or inherited, during the marriage." However, notwithstanding appellant's concession of this well-established principle, see, e.g., Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), she argues that she should be allowed to retain the full value of her trailer while appellee should not be allowed to do the same. Appellant contends that "[her] trailer was always her separate property," but that appellee's trailer is not his separate property. Appellant never advances any meaningful or persuasive reason for treating the two trailers differently, and we refuse to countenance her position that "her house was really her house while 'his' house was 'theirs.'" Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Appellant also asserts she "was denied the benefit of the furniture that was made [by appellee] during the marriage." However, beyond that bare allegation, she makes no argument supporting her claim to some of the furniture, and she fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the homemade furniture to appellee. In sum, the trial court's decisions concerning the trailer homes and the furniture were not "'clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.'" Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).

Appellant's only other argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a continuance, which she sought on the day of trial in order to obtain an appraisal of the value of appellee's trailer home. However, because we have confirmed that appellant is not entitled to any interest in appellee's trailer home, its appraised value is immaterial in this case. Accordingly, we need not reach this issue.

Affirmed.
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge
 
 
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge