Straley v. Galetka

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Robert Dale Straley,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Hank Galetka,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No.
Case No. 990704-CA

F I L E D
December 7, 2000  2000 UT App 348

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Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable William A. Thorne
 

Attorneys:
Robert Dale Straley, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Robert Dale Straley appeals the dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief. The district court dismissed the petition alleging violation of due process in two separate disciplinary proceedings that resulted in imposition of 30 days and 15 days in punitive isolation. The court concluded that "the disciplinary actions did not result in deprivation of a protected liberty interest."

"A prisoner's liberty interests may arise from either the Due Process Clause itself or from state law." Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1999). "State-created liberty interests . . . are 'generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Straley did not allege in district court that the period of punitive isolation imposed an "atypical and significant hardship." See Sandin v. Conner, 595 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995) (holding 30 days in segregated confinement "did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest"). Because Straley did not allege a significant or atypical hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life, the district court did not err in dismissing the petition for failure to state a claim.

Straley further contends that because a prison disciplinary record may impact parole decisions under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, a liberty interest arises that must be protected by due process. He claims an October 15, 1998 decision of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole setting his case for rehearing was based "solely" upon his prison disciplinary record. However, the rationale for the decision listed seven aggravating factors, including the prison disciplinary record, and three mitigating factors. Straley's claim is entirely speculative. Sandin suggested due process may be required if the sanction imposed "will inevitably affect the duration of a [prisoner's] sentence"; however, the court found nothing in Hawaii's laws that required its parole board to grant or deny parole based upon misconduct, although prison conduct was a relevant consideration. Id. at 487. Accordingly, the court concluded "the decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations," and "[t]he chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause." Id. Similarly, Utah statutes and regulations do not mandate denial of parole based upon a disciplinary record or require a grant of parole based upon absence of a disciplinary record. Straley's disciplinary record was one of several factors noted in the Board's rationale for setting the case for rehearing rather than granting parole. The district court properly concluded that Straley had not demonstrated a basis to apply due process to his prison disciplinary proceedings.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the petition.
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge
 
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
 
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge