Rasmussen v. Rasmussen

----ooOoo----

Christine Rasmussen,
Petitioner and Appellee,

v.

Lynn James Rasmussen,
Respondent and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990977-CA

F I L E D
September 28, 2000 2000 UT App 264 -----

Sixth District, Manti Department
The Honorable Louis G. Tervort

Attorneys:
J. Bruce Reading and Lisa A. Jones, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Brian C. Harrison, Provo, for Appellee -----

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Thorne.

BENCH, Judge:

Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Ms. Rasmussen $850 per month in alimony. We disagree. Although in determining alimony the trial court must consider the payor spouse's ability to provide support, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2000), the court may attempt to "equalize the parties' standards of living, not just their incomes, in those cases in which insufficient resources exist to satisfy both parties' legitimate needs." Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219,¶11, 983 P.2d 1103; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(d) (Supp. 2000). In this case, both parties appear to fall short of meeting their legitimate monthly needs. The alimony award was proper because it attempted to "equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to impute income to Ms. Rasmussen in determining alimony. He argues that the policy requiring a court to impute income in the child support arena should apply to this case. However, applying that rationale, the trial court did not err in failing to impute income to Ms. Rasmussen because it found that she was in the process of obtaining her nurse practitioner's license. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(d) (Supp. 2000) (providing in context of child support, court may not impute income if "parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills"). Therefore, because appellant failed to show a "clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion," we will not disturb the trial court's award of spousal support. Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333.

Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering appellant to pay debt that he claims he has no ability to pay. Appellant's brief on this issue fails to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as it is so lacking in analysis that it improperly "'shift[s] the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.'" Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,¶8, 995 P.2d 14 (citation omitted). We therefore refuse to discuss the merits of this issue. See id.

Appellant finally argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $1000 towards Ms. Rasmussen's attorney fees. He argues that the court made no finding that the fees were reasonable or that appellant had the ability to pay. The trial court, however, did make the necessary findings. The court stated that Ms. Rasmussen is "unable to pay her own attorney fees and is therefore in need of assistance from [appellant], that [appellant] has the ability to contribute towards [Ms. Rasmussen's] legal fees, and that the attorney's fees submitted by counsel for [Ms. Rasmussen] are reasonable and have been necessarily incurred." Therefore, we affirm the award ordering appellant to pay $1000 to Ms. Rasmussen for attorney fees.

Accordingly, we affirm.
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge
 
 
 

______________________________
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge