State of Utah v. Hollands

----ooOoo----

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Isaac Hollands,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990375-CA

F I L E D
February 3, 2000

2000 UT App 015 -----

Third District, West Valley Department
The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg

Attorneys:
David P. Mack and Kent R. Hart, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Jackson.

JACKSON, Judge:

We review the trial court's imposition of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).

When deciding whether to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences, the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999). While it is true that our law "'favors concurrent sentences,'" State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted), the trial court nonetheless has the discretion to impose consecutive sentences. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1999) ("Sentences . . . shall run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively." (Emphasis added.)).

The record reflects that the trial court requested a pre-sentence report and considered its contents. The report addressed "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses" as well as defendant's "history, character, and rehabilitative needs." Id. § 76-3-401(4). Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel argued at length in favor of concurrent sentences. Our review of the record satisfies us that the trial court considered the factors required by law, and we cannot conclude that "'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (alteration in original) (quoting Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.
 
 
 

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 

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Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge
 
 
 

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James Z. Davis, Judge