Harlan v. Harlan

----ooOoo----

Wesley John Harlan,
Petitioner and Appellee,

v.

Bonnie Kathleen Harlan,
Respondent and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990011-CA

F I L E D
March 30, 2000
  2000 UT App 89 -----

Eighth District, Roosevelt Department
The Honorable John R. Anderson

Attorneys:
Brian J. Gardner and Mary C. Corporon, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Clark B. Allred and Clark A. McClellan, Vernal, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Billings.

JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:

Wife's core argument is as follows: The fact that discrepancies exist between the trial court's original ruling and the final divorce decree, findings of fact, and conclusions of law necessarily equals "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). However, "[u]ntil a court files its findings of fact, no decision has been rendered or final ruling made. Any judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is formally rendered." Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985); see also Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade, 92 Utah 50, 61, 63 P.2d 1070, 1075 (1936) ("The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree when made and filed must alone be looked to for [what has been found or decided], and when these are made or entered they cannot be qualified or limited by any prior oral or written opinion by the judge."); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("'[A] trial court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents . . . ." (Citation omitted; alterations in original.)). We endorse the trial court's right to change its mind without automatically inviting a Rule 60(b)(1) motion.

Moreover, we have reviewed the record evidence and applicable statutes(1) and have determined they support the final divorce decree, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. It is difficult to understand how Wife can assert the court was mistaken, neglectful, or inadvertent when its final ruling reflects statutory law and evidence submitted at trial. Likewise, it is difficult to understand how Wife can assert she was unfairly surprised by the court's ruling when she was there to hear the supporting evidence. We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife's Rule 60(b)(1) motion.

Finally, we address some peripheral matters raised by Wife. First, our review of the record shows the trial court had ample documentation of each party's objections to the other side's proposed divorce decrees, findings of fact, and conclusions of law before the court made its final decision. Second, our review of the record also shows that Wife did not request hearings on either the trial court's decision on which set of final rulings to sign or its decision on her Rule 60(b) motion; she is thus foreclosed at this stage from asking for a remand for hearings on these decisions. Third, our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary for us to address Wife's arguments regarding the contents of the order-to-show-cause stipulation and whether she properly listed the Rule 60(b) grounds upon which her motion relied.

We deny Wife's request for costs and grant Husband's request for attorney fees on appeal. We remand only for a determination of Husband's reasonable attorney fees. Affirmed.
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge

1. The applicable statutes involve the children's health insurance premium. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1999) ("The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: . . . (b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children . . . ."); id. § 78-45-7.15(1), (3) (1996) ("The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. . . . The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance.").