Brockbank v. Brockbank

----ooOoo----

Penny Brockbank,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

James L. Brockbank,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990547-CA

F I L E D
June 2, 2000 2000 UT App 163 -----

Seventh District, Price Department
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday

Attorneys:
Brent D. Young and Laura M. Crossman, Provo, for Appellant
John E. Schindler, Price, for Appellee

-----

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme.

GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

The trial court issued an order which "restrained and enjoined [appellant] from taking any action to convey or pledge any of the real property awarded him by the Supplemental Decree." Appellant subsequently conveyed a right of redemption and contemporaneously executed a warranty deed conveying his remaining interest in the property. Appellant argues the conveyance of his right of redemption did not violate the court order because a right of redemption is not an interest in property subject to the order. As discussed in Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996), the purpose of the trial court's order was "to prevent the parties from removing the marital assets from the jurisdiction of the [trial] court." Id. at 976. Appellant's use of a warranty deed to convey an interest in property is evidenced by the language of the deed: "JAMES L. BROCKBANK, grantor of Price, County of Carbon, hereby conveys and warrants to . . . ." Cf. Stucki v. Ellis, 114 Utah 486, 201 P.2d 486, 490 (1949) (stating best method to convey property interest is by deed); see also Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1994) (governing form of warranty deed: "Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form . . . "). Thus, the trial court was justified in finding appellant in contempt for violating its order prohibiting him from conveying his real property, and we need not determine whether appellant also violated the order by conveying his right of redemption.

Appellant next argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve sixty days in jail(1) or obtain a reconveyance of the property from the third party grantee in order to purge the contempt finding. In other words, appellant could choose to either serve time in jail, or he could purge the contempt finding by obtaining the property back from the third party to whom he conveyed it--thus restoring the status quo. Appellant chose to serve thirty days in jail,(2) and thus he is no longer subject to the court's second alternative that he obtain a reconveyance in order to purge the contempt. Because the trial court's contempt order has been satisfied, the trial court cannot impose any further penalties for that contempt and cannot mandate that the parties take any further action. Therefore, this court can provide no relief affecting the rights of the parties, and the issue is moot. See Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119,¶11, 977 P.2d 1218, cert. denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).

Finally, appellee cross-appeals the trial court's award of attorney fees, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her the entire amount of her requested fees. In her brief, appellee cites no authority supporting her position. We "'decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.'" State v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 2,¶11, 974 P.2d 269 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's contempt finding and award of attorney fees.
 
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge -----

I CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge -----

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. Under section 78-32-10, "the court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both." Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10 (1996). The parties dispute whether the court had authority to impose a longer sentence because it found appellant in contempt on multiple grounds.

2. At oral argument, counsel stated that the trial court reduced the sixty day sentence to thirty days, and that appellant had served thirty days in jail.