State of Utah. v Winfield

----ooOoo----

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Carl Alton Winfield, Jr.,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 971130-CA

F I L E D
April 29, 1999
  1999 UT App 137 -----

Fourth District, Fillmore Department
The Honorable Fred D. Howard

Attorneys:
D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Dexter L. Anderson, Fillmore, for Appellee

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Before Judges Wilkins, Bench, and Billings.

BENCH, Judge:

Defendant represented himself at trial and was convicted by a jury. He does not challenge his waiver of the right to counsel, but he asserts his conviction should be reversed because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. "'[W]hatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of "effective assistance of counsel."'" State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 189 (Utah 1987) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 n.46 (1975)).

Defendant first argues the trial court failed to make a meaningful inquiry into whether a conflict existed between defendant and counsel who was appointed to represent him in pretrial proceedings. This argument is moot because defendant knowingly waived his right to counsel, eliminating a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. Moreover, during the time in which defendant was represented by counsel, the trial court inquired several times about potential problems between defendant and appointed counsel. The trial court adequately inquired into any potential conflict, and did not err in permitting defendant to represent himself.

Defendant next argues he was denied the right of compulsory process to obtain witnesses because out-of-county subpoenas were not served on two character witnesses he desired to call at trial. Once defendant chose to represent himself, it was his responsibility to ensure service of the subpoenas. In any event, the trial court offered defendant a continuance on the day of trial to allow him to procure the witnesses. Defendant declined the court's invitation of a continuance.(1) Therefore, any problems relating to these witnesses resulted from defendant's representation of himself and his decision to forego the continuance offered by the trial court.

Defendant's final argument is that the "split verdict has manifest a repugnant verdict." We find this argument to be unsupported by legal authority(2) and without merit. The verdict rendered in this case is not repugnant or otherwise improper.

Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction.
 
 

 
Russell W. Bench, Judge

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WE CONCUR:
 
 

 
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
 
 

 
Judith M. Billings, Judge

1. Defendant claims he did not want a continuance because it would prolong his incarceration in the interim. It must be noted, however, that defendant was already under a federal hold that prevented his release from custody.

2. This court "'is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).