Dept. of Public Safety v. Mair

----ooOoo---- Department of Public Safety, Driver License Division, State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Lonnie R. Mair,

Defendant and Appellant. )
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)) MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 981523-CA

F I L E D
(December 17, 1998)

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Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Anne M. Stirba

Attorneys:
Steven Lee Payton, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from an order of the district court denying his motion to vacate the findings and conclusions of the Department of Public Safety. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

Appellant has already served his ninety day suspension and this court can, therefore, provide no meaningful relief. See Phillips v. Schwendiman, 802 P.2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Phillips, this court dismissed two consolidated appeals as moot where the appeals were filed after the appellants' license revocation periods had expired, noting that "Utah courts have consistently refused to hear the merits of driver's license revocation appeals rendered moot because the revocation period has expired." Phillips, 802 P.2d at 110. See also Jones v. Schwendiman, 721 P.2d 893,894 (Utah 1986) (case is moot where requested judicial relief cannot affect rights of the litigants, such as where order of license revocation has expired by its own terms).

In his memorandum in opposition to this court's sua sponte motion to dismiss, appellant spends a great deal of time expounding generally the federal constitutional implications of the appellee's actions, characterizing the issue as "significant." However, appellant ignores the fundamental reality of mootness. The focus of the mootness inquiry is whether any requested judicial relief can affect the rights of the litigants. With the expiration of the relatively short expiration period, any "opinion issued by this court would have no practical or significant legal effect upon the validity of the revocation[] or upon appellant's legal rights." Phillips, 802 P.2d at 110.

Nor would the requested result remedy a recurring wrong affecting the public interest yet evading appellate review. The departmental regulation upon which the alleged inconsistent departmental action is based has been amended to conform to the repeal of the statutory requirement for a sworn report, and the issue raised by appellant cannot arise again. Thus, "the issue raised is not of sufficient public interest that we should hear its merits." Id.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
 

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Judith M. Billings, Judge

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

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Norman H. Jackson, Judge