Mancil v. Smith
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Dawn Mancil,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Gerald Smith,
Defendant and Appellant.
State of Utah, Office of
Recovery Services,
Intervenor.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 990804-CA
F I L E D
(December 29, 2000) 2000 UT App 378
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Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable Guy R. Burningham
Attorneys:
Don R. Petersen and Leslie
W. Slaugh, Provo, for Appellant
Dawn Mancil, Orem, Appellee
Pro Se
Karma Dixon, Salt Lake City,
for Intervenor
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Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.
ORME, Judge:
Appellant Gerald Smith appeals
the trial court's dismissal of his petition to modify his child support
obligation. His main contention is that income should not have been imputed
to him while he was a full-time college student, earning a bachelor's degree.
We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Smith and Dawn Mancil were married
on July 17, 1991. During the course of their marriage, they had two children.
Throughout the marriage, Smith suffered from a severe hearing disability,
but had several jobs, including working on a loading dock, in a cafeteria,
as a janitor, and as a mail clerk.
The parties were divorced in
1995. Smith was in school at the time of the divorce. The divorce decree
ordered Smith to begin to pay child support as soon as he was "employed
or no longer attends school full time, or graduates from college, or becomes
financially solvent, or for any other reason." A few weeks after the divorce,
Smith dropped out of school and began work at Enrich Corporation as a mail
clerk, but he failed to inform the court or Mancil that he was working
and made no effort to pay child support.
In 1997, the Office of Recovery
Services filed a motion to intervene in the parties' divorce case because
it was providing support for Mancil and the children. The motion to intervene
was granted, and the State then filed a petition to modify the prior decree
regarding child support. Mancil joined in the State's petition. The State
and Mancil sought to have Smith pay child support, given his employment
with Enrich Corporation. In the fall of 1997, Smith quit his job at Enrich
and moved to Rochester, New York, to obtain a bachelor's degree at a technology
school for the deaf.
At the trial on the State's
petition in January of 1998, the trial court ruled in favor of the State.
The trial court imputed income of $1,040 per month to Smith based on his
income at his prior jobs. The trial court specifically rejected Smith's
argument that his enrollment at the technology school was "training to
establish basic job skills," which would exempt him from income imputation
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(d) (Supp. 2000).
An Order of Modification was entered in April of 1998, requiring Smith
to pay monthly child support.
Just prior to the entry of the
Order of Modification, Smith filed a Petition to Amend Decree of Divorce
based on the Social Security Administration's determination that he was
disabled. A few months later, Smith filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that he was a full-time student with no income other than his Social
Security Disability Insurance and so should be excused from paying child
support.
Oral argument on Smith's summary
judgment motion was held on May 27, 1999. The trial court denied Smith's
motion for summary judgment. It also held that the determination by the
Social Security Administration that Smith was disabled was not a substantial
change of circumstances which justified modifying the prior award of child
support and granted the State's motion to dismiss. Smith appealed.
At oral argument before this
court, Mancil, appearing pro se, presented her position to this court as
best she could. Given the important question of the propriety of imputing
income to an obligor who is attending college to obtain a bachelor's degree,
this court was concerned with the potentially far-reaching implications
of our ruling. Therefore, we asked the State, which inexplicably had not
participated in the appeal, to file a brief detailing its perspective "on
the important questions of policy and statutory interpretation presented
in the appeal." It did so in timely fashion, and Smith filed a reply.
ISSUES AND STANDARD
OF REVIEW
We first address whether the
trial court correctly determined that Smith's pursuit of a bachelor's degree
did not exempt him from having income imputed to him because such a course
of higher education does not constitute "career or occupational training
to establish basic job skills" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(d)(iii)
(Supp. 2000). This is a question of statutory construction, reviewed for
correctness. See Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 244 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (1994).
Second, Smith contends that
even if income could legally be imputed to him, the trial court erred in
imputing income absent specific findings concerning the prevailing earnings
of persons of similar backgrounds in the community and his potential for
employment. A trial court's findings are adequate only if they are "'sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Stevens
v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted).
Third, Smith argues that the
trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition to amend based on
its conclusion that the Social Security Administration's determination
of disability was not a substantial change of circumstance justifying a
modification of child support. "In determining whether a trial court properly
dismissed an action under Rule 12(b)(6), we assume that the factual allegations
in the complaint are true and we draw all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff." Whipple v. American Fork Irr.
Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996). We review a determination on
whether a substantial change of circumstances has been shown for abuse
of discretion. See Wells, 871 P.2d at 1038.
ANALYSIS
A. Basic Job Skills
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5
(Supp. 2000) specifies how the income of a parent is determined in calculating
child support. When a parent is found to be voluntarily unemployed, as
was Smith in this case, the trial court may impute income to that parent.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7) (Supp. 2000). However, the
imputation of income is prohibited in a limited number of circumstances,
including when "a parent is engaged in career or occupational training
to establish basic job skills." Id. § 78-45-7.5(7)(d)(iii).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b)
(Supp. 2000).
______________________________
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WE CONCUR:
______________________________
______________________________
1. Or,
for that matter, any of the limitations on income imputation contained
in section 78-45-7.5(7)(d).
2. For
better or worse, one's income level and resulting ability to pay child
support are not necessarily enhanced by a college education. A good car
salesman with a high school diploma may well earn more than an elementary
school teacher with a bachelor's degree.
3. The
trial court found that Smith's Social Security benefits were "not . . .
income for the purposes of determining child support based on adjusted
gross income." That finding has not been challenged on appeal.
The parties agree that the precise
scope of what constitutes "career or occupational training to establish
basic job skills" has never been determined by our appellate courts. Relying
on our opinion in Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 n.1 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), which held that education beyond a bachelor's degree was not
"career or occupational training to establish basic job skills," Smith
contends that a bachelor's degree would therefore so qualify. Alternatively,
he argues that at least his quest for a bachelor's degree was "to establish
basic job skills" in the field of computer technology.
Section 78-45-7.5 is part of
a model act, the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act (UCLSA), see
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 (l996), which has been adopted in Utah. The
statute does not define the term "basic job skills," and neither the parties
nor the State have called to our attention any pertinent legislative history
or commentary from the drafters of the UCLSA. In addition, the UCLSA has
apparently been adopted in only two other states, Maine and New Hampshire,
see id. ("Uniform Laws" note), but neither of these states' versions
of the act contain the "basic job skills" provision at issue in this case.(1)
See Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 19A-3501 to -06 (1999); New
Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 546-A:1 to -12 (2000). Therefore,
neither state has any case law analyzing the scope of this provision.
Absent helpful case law, we
consider the plain meaning of the key terms. Smith's argument that his
pursuit of a bachelor's degree is "career or occupational training to establish
basic job skills" does not correspond to how those words are commonly defined.
The dictionary defines "career" as "a field for or pursuit of consecutive
progressive achievement." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
338 (1993) (emphasis added). "Occupation" is defined as "a craft, trade,
profession or other means of earning a living." Id. at 1560. Finally,
"basic" is defined as "constituting or serving as the basis or starting
point." Id. at 181. Viewed in this context, it seems clear that
the basic job skills training envisioned by the statute is training which
can aid a person in achieving an income beyond the minimum wage job which
can be had with no training at all, i.e., training for the "starting point"
on a "consecutive progressive" career track. Of course, a bachelor's degree
provides employment opportunities far beyond what is needed "as the basis
or starting point" to rise above a minimum wage job. Thus, a four-year
college education is not the "training to establish basic job skills" that
is contemplated by the statute, which training would ordinarily be of a
much shorter duration.
Our conclusion is fully consistent
with the policy underlying Utah's child support laws, which are designed
to maximize support to children from both parents. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-3(1) (Supp. 2000) ("Every father shall support his child[.]");
id. § 78-45-4(1) ("Every woman shall support her child[.]").
"Utah's clear policy is to require both parents to support their child
to the extent that each is financially able." Department of Human Servs.
ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 683 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman,
C.J., dissenting). To allow a parent to disregard this duty over the course
of a four-year college education would run counter to this policy. A child's
right to ongoing support should not be held hostage to a parent's desire
to get a higher education, even if the parent's degree will eventually
allow the parent to pay support at a higher level.(2)
Morever, in today's society,
the pursuit of a higher education simply does not preclude employment.
In 1998, 14% of full-time college students in the United States worked
full time, while an additional 38% worked at least part time. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Employment Status of High School and College Students
15 Years Old and Over, by Level of School, Attendance Status, Age, Gender,
Race, and Hispanic Origin: October 1998, (October 6, 1999)
Therefore, we hold that section
78-45-7.5(7) applies only to short-term job training that is a condition
of employment at a fairly fundamental level. It is not necessary in this
case that we definitively state what kind of training would qualify: Would
a year of vocational school training in welding? An 18-month course to
obtain a paralegal's certificate? A two-year program at a community college
culminating in an associate's degree in bookkeeping? We can, however, say
that obtaining a bachelor's degree affords employment at a level so far
beyond "basic" that, as a matter of law, it does not satisfy the statute.
B. Imputation of Income
The trial court based its calculation
of child support on Smith's imputed income. Section 78-45-7.5(7) governs
the imputation of income for purposes of determining support obligations.
The statute states:
If income is imputed
to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable
earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median
earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area
as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Smith argues that in imputing
income to a parent, a trial court must make explicit findings on each of
the factors listed in section 78-45-7.5(7). His reading of the statute
is too strict. In Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, a parent
argued that the trial court erred in imputing income to her based solely
on her past work history. See Reese, 1999 UT 75 at ¶11.
The trial court had failed to make any specific findings regarding her
"occupation qualifications" or the "prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community." Id. at ¶15. The Utah
Supreme Court held that these findings were "necessarily implied by the
nature of the work [she] had regularly performed [in the past]." Id.
The trial court in this case
did basically the same thing as was done by the trial court in Reese.
The court looked at Smith's prior work history and noted his wages at his
last place of employment, Enrich Corporation. The court also looked at
his employment history and income prior to his employment at Enrich. The
court then imputed income at a rate of pay, $6.00 an hour, that was less
than Smith's pay rate at Enrich, but consistent with his longer-term employment
history. Explicit findings concerning "occupational qualifications" and
"prevailing earnings of persons of similar backgrounds in the community"
were not necessary, as Smith's qualifications, background, and actual past
earnings were not in dispute. See id. at ¶¶15-16. Therefore,
there was an adequate factual basis supporting the trial court's decision
to impute income to Smith at a rate of $6.00 an hour.
C. Child Support Modification
"[C]hild support modifications
are proper only when the party seeking modification demonstrates a material
change in circumstances." Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 958 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(1)(a) (Supp. 2000).
The Social Security Administration's determination that Smith was disabled
was not a material change in circumstances justifying a child support modification.
Smith's hearing impairment was
of longstanding duration and existed at the time of the divorce. The Social
Security determination did not change the fact that Smith had held numerous
full-time jobs while suffering from the same severe hearing disability
that was the basis of the disability determination. Because the determination
did not signal that his condition had worsened in any way, Smith would
presumably be capable of holding similar jobs in the future. All the determination
did was make him eligible for $448 a month in Social Security disability
benefits.(3) The Social Security determination
simply did not affect the trial court's conclusion that Smith had worked
full time in the recent past and was capable of paying child support. Smith
presented no evidence that his disability had worsened or that he was no
longer able to hold a full-time job. Without a showing of a relevant "material
change in circumstance," the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing
his petition to amend.
CONCLUSION
We uphold the trial court's
dismissal of Smith's petition to amend. First, the pursuit of a bachelor's
degree does not constitute "career or occupational training to establish
basic job skills" under section 78-45-7.57(d)(iii), and it was therefore
proper to impute income to Smith. Second, there was adequate factual support
for the income rate imputed to Smith by the trial court. Finally, the Social
Security Administration's disability determination was not a material change
of circumstance justifying a modification of the child support order.
Affirmed.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
Judith M. Billings, Judge
William A. Thorne, Jr.,
Judge
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