State of Utah v. Terwilliger
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
----ooOoo----
State of Utah,
Appellee,
v.
Peter Allen Terwilliger,
Appellant.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 981748-CA
F I L E D
November 18, 1999
1999 UT App 337
-----
Seventh District Juvenile,
Monticello Department
The Honorable Scott N. Johansen
Attorneys:
William L. Schultz, Moab,
for Appellant
Jan Graham and Kenneth A.
Bronston, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
-----
Before Judges Wilkins, Greenwood, and Davis.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
¶1.
Defendant appeals from his
conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801 (1995). His appeal is on two grounds:
(1) that insufficient evidence supported his conviction, and (2) that he
was a target of selective prosecution. We reverse.
RELEVANT FACTS
¶2.
Early in the morning of
July 15, 1998, Deputy Archie Walker of the Grand County Sheriff's office
received a report of a suspected DUI in the vicinity of Ken's Lake, Utah,
a notorious drinking spot. Shortly after arriving at the lake, Deputy Walker
saw a small group of young people surrounded by three vehicles parked just
off the road. He asked if any of them knew anything about the DUI. They
suggested he look for a white pickup truck.
¶3.
Deputy Walker circled the
lake, but could not locate a white truck. He returned to the site where
he had encountered the group to investigate further. When he arrived, defendant
and defendant's friend, Josh Shumway, were present and standing by Shumway's
truck. They had arrived approximately fifteen minutes before Deputy Walker's
second visit. An open container of alcohol was nearby. Deputy Walker recognized
several of the people in the group as locals who were under the age of
twenty-one. The group consisted of one adult, seven adult minors(1)
(including defendant), and two minors, all of whom were standing in a small
semi-circle approximately twenty feet wide. Deputy Walker got out of his
patrol vehicle and detected the odor of alcohol. He also noticed several
open beer bottles and discarded beer cans, several of which were similar
to those in the cooler in the back of Shumway's truck.
¶4.
Deputy Walker then questioned
each individual in the group. He also spoke with defendant, who admitted
to drinking alcohol that evening but denied that the minors were drinking
his beer. A blood alcohol test revealed defendant's blood alcohol level
was .052.
¶5.
Defendant was charged with
the unlawful purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol by a minor.(2)See
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-209(1) (Supp. 1997). He was also charged with
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After a bench trial, the trial
court found defendant guilty of both charges. In support of its ruling,
the trial court made the following findings:
There were several cars,
at least ten people, and they were just sitting around talking to each
other and drinking. And there were two girls there and they were drinking,
and they were under age. And I simply don't believe the testimony that
nobody saw any alcohol, nobody saw any drinking. That's just not the way
these things happen. You all got together, everybody was drinking, everybody
can see that everybody was drinking . . . . But, the question is did anyone
permit someone under the age of eighteen to consume an alcoholic beverage
in their--in their presence. . . . [T]he testimony is that [A.O.] and [V.E.]
were drinking, and I simply don't believe that these two defendants didn't
see that. So, I'm gonna find you guilty.
¶6.
The trial court made no
other findings. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
¶7.
Defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for contributing
to the delinquency of a minor. Specifically, he argues the trial court
erred when it found defendant's mere presence at the drinking party was
tantamount to "permitting" minors to consume alcohol, which the applicable
statute prohibits. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(1)(d)(ii)
(Supp. 1999).
¶8.
The relevant portion of
section 78-3a-801 provides:
(1) The court shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to try the following adults for offenses committed
against minors:
. . . .
(d) Any person 18 years of age
or older who:
(i) Provides a minor with
an alcoholic beverage or a controlled substance; or
(ii) Encourages or permits a minor to consume an alcoholic beverage or controlled substance. (Emphasis added.)
¶9.
The State argues the evidence
shows "the minors were drinking with defendant present and that he was
aware of the drinking." Defendant did nothing to stop the minors from consuming
alcohol. This alone, the State contends, "is sufficient to support his
adjudication for contributing to the delinquency of the minors present"
because defendant permitted the minors to consume alcohol.(3)
¶10.
In order to determine whether
there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant, we must first determine
if the meaning of "permit," as used in the statute, applies to defendant's
conduct. When interpreting statutory language, "we presume that the Legislature
used each word advisedly, and we give effect to each term according to
its ordinary and accepted meaning." Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes &
Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995).
¶11.
The plain language of the
statute does not support the State's argument. Webster's defines "permit"
as "to consent to expressly or formally[;] . . . to give leave [or] authorize[;]
. . . to make possible [or] to give an opportunity [or] allow." Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 876 (1986). This definition suggests some
measure of control or participation--in other words, active or knowing
acquiescence.
¶12.
The trial court in this
case, however, made no finding indicating defendant had some measure of
control over the minors' consumption of alcohol. Instead, the trial court
based its ruling on the fact that defendant simply witnessed two minors
in his presence consuming alcohol. We believe the plain language of section
78-3a-801 does not sustain the prosecution or conviction of a defendant
who, at most, merely sees others violate the law. Cf. State v.
Fertig, 120 Utah 224, 228, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (1951) ("Mere presence
combined with knowledge that a crime is about to be committed . . . will
not of itself constitute one an accomplice."); State v. Krueger,
975 P.2d 489, 495 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (stating section 78-3a-801(1)(a)(ii)
requires "the State
. . . to prove . . . the
defendants intended for the children to chew the tobacco."), cert. granted,
1999 Utah LEXIS 141 (July 26, 1999) (No. 990362); State v. Labrum,
959 P.2d 120, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("'Mere presence, or even prior
knowledge, does not make one an accomplice when he neither advises, instigates,
encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime.'" (quoting State
v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980))); Commonwealth v. Fields,
333 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 1975) ("[M]ere presence at the scene of a crime
is not, in itself, sufficient to establish that one is an active partner
in the intent of another to commit the crime.").(4)
¶13.
We thus conclude the clear
weight of the evidence in this case did not support a finding that defendant
"permitted" minors to consume alcohol. Consequently, we reverse the trial
court's ruling and vacate defendant's conviction for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor.(5)
______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge
-----
¶14.
I CONCUR:
______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge
-----
¶15.
I DISSENT:
______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
1. Utah's Juvenile Code defines a minor as any person under eighteen years old. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(p) (1999). According to Utah's Alcoholic Beverages title, however, a minor is a person under the age of twenty-one. See Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(28); see also id. § 32A-12-203 ("Unlawful sale or supply to minors"); id. § 32A-12-209 ("Unlawful purchase, possession, or consumption by minors"). Because this case involves both titles, we refer to persons eighteen to twenty-one years old as "adult minors."
2. Defendant did not seriously contest this charge at trial. In fact, one of defendant's own witnesses testified, without objection, that defendant was drinking alcohol at the gathering.
3. The State does not argue defendant "encouraged" the minors to consume alcohol, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-801(1)(d)(ii) (Supp. 1999), only that he permitted the minors to drink. According to the State, the evidence "clearly establish[es] that not only were minors drinking in defendant's presence, but also that because he could not reasonably have been unaware of that drinking, he 'permitted' minor[s] to consume alcohol."
4. The State cites State v. Magee, 837 P.2d 993, 997 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), and State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that criminal liability may be imposed on defendants who are merely aware of a foreseeable criminal act but who do nothing to prevent its commission. Those cases, however, are inapposite to our analysis. Both Magee and Howell were decided under section 76-5-109, Utah's child abuse statute. Furthermore, the trial courts in those cases were required to and did find that the defendants acted recklessly in permitting child abuse. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(3)(b) (1990) (imposing class B misdemeanor status to recklessly causing or permitting another to inflict physical injury on a child). We therefore do not find these cases helpful.
5. Defendant does not challenge his conviction for the purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol by a minor. The conviction on that charge therefore stands. Additionally, because we conclude insufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, we need not address whether defendant was the target of selective prosecution.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.