Roy Robertson v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 114th District Court of Smith County
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
ROY LEE ROBERTSON,
APPEAL FROM THE 114TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
Roy Lee Robertson ("Appellant") appeals his seven-year sentence for driving while intoxicated, which was imposed following the revocation of his probation. Appellant raises one issue on appeal. We affirm.
Appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated (1) and pleaded "guilty." The trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment for ten years, but probated Appellant's sentence for a period of ten years.
On February 16, 2000, the State of Texas (the "State") filed an application to proceed to final adjudication, alleging that Appellant had violated certain terms and conditions of his probation. Although Appellant admitted to violating his probation as alleged, the trial court declined to revoke Appellant's probation at that time.
Subsequently, on June 7, 2000, the State filed another motion to revoke Appellant's probation. Appellant pleaded "true" to the single violation alleged in the State's application and an evidentiary hearing was conducted. Following the hearing, the trial court found the violation alleged by the State to be "true," revoked Appellant's probation, sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for seven years and fined Appellant five thousand dollars.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court constituted cruel and unusual punishment under both the Texas and United States Constitutions. (2) Initially, we note that Appellant made no objection to the trial court raising the issue of cruel and unusual punishment and has, therefore, waived such an issue with respect to any alleged violation of his rights under the Texas Constitution. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. However, even absent waiver, we conclude that Appellant's sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1995, pet. ref'd); see also Simmons v. State, 944 S.W.2d at 15. Courts have repeatedly held that punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. In the case at hand, Appellant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated, a third degree felony. See Tex. Pen. Code 49.04; Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 49.09(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003). The punishment range for such an offense is between two and ten years. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 12.34(a) (Vernon 1994). Here, the punishment assessed by the trial court falls well within the range set forth by the legislature. Id. Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual or excessive per se.
Nonetheless, Appellant urges the Court to perform the three-part test set out in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. (3) The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin, to require a threshold determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before addressing the remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder, 954 F. 2d at 316; see also Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
In determining whether Appellant's sentence is grossly disproportionate, we are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estell, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980). (4) In Rummel, the Supreme Court addressed the proportionality claim of an appellant who had received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas habitual offender statute for a conviction for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. The life sentence was imposed because the appellant also had two prior felony convictions - one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods or services and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1134-35. After both recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as felonies and considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court determined that the appellant's mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 445 U.S. at 285, 100 S. Ct. at 1145. Considering Appellant's sentence in light of the holding in Rummel, the distinction between the two cases is clear. The offense committed by Appellant - driving while intoxicated - is more serious than any of the offenses committed by the appellant in Rummel, while Appellant's seven-year sentence is less severe than the life sentence upheld by the Supreme Court. Thus, it follows that if the sentence in Rummel was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, then neither is the sentence assessed against Appellant in the case at hand. Therefore, since we do not find the threshold test to be satisfied, we need not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Opinion delivered December 20, 2002.
Panel consisted of Gohmert, Jr., C.J., Worthen, J., and Griffith, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
1. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 49.04 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
2. Since there are no distinctions between the state and federal protections against cruel and unusual punishment, we address such claims together. See Simmons v. State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Tex. App.- Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd).
3. The strict application of the Solem test has been questioned since the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991). See Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 15. The Texarkana Court of Appeals discussed the applicability of Solem in Davis v. State, and observed that five members of the Supreme Court in Harmelin rejected application of the three-factor test. Id. (citing Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664). However, the court in Davis nevertheless evaluated the sentence under the elements of Solem, recognizing that seven of the justices in Harmelin still supported an Eighth Amendment prohibition against grossly disproportionate sentences. See Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664 (citing McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F. 2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992) and Lackey v. State, 881 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd)).
4. Incidentally, the Fifth Circuit has referred to Rummell as a "handy guide" to assist in conducting a proportionality review. See McGruder, 954 F. 2d at 317.