JUAN ESCATIOLA v. THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 117th District Court of Nueces County

NUMBERS 13-07-176-CR

 
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JUAN ESCATIOLA, Appellant,

v.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 
Before Justices Ya ez, Rodriguez, and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza

After a jury trial, appellant, Juan Escatiola, was convicted of possession of marihuana, less than fifty pounds and more than five. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 481.121(b)(4) (Vernon 2003). After finding a habitual felony offender enhancement to be "true," the trial judge sentenced Escatiola to twenty-five years' imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Escatiola contests his conviction by two issues which challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 18, 2006, an investigation conducted by the Texas Department of Public Safety and the United States Border Patrol uncovered a package containing 18.16 pounds of marihuana at a Federal Express hub in Pharr, Texas. The package was addressed to "Carlos Garza" at 615 25th Street, Corpus Christi, Texas, and the return address indicated it was sent from "Junle Martinez," 2401 17th Street, McAllen, Texas. (1) The next morning, officers set up surveillance at the Corpus Christi address. One officer observed Juan Escatiola, who lived at the Corpus Christi address, leaning on the residence's front fence, talking on his cell phone, and looking up and down the street.

That afternoon, around 2 p.m., Officer Corey Lee, dressed as a Federal Express delivery man, delivered the package containing marihuana to the residence. While the officer approached the porch, Escatiola walked out of the house and down towards the officer. Officer Lee asked Escatiola, "Are you Mr. Garza?" and Escatiola nodded and said "yes." The officer then asked, "Carlos Garza?" and Escatiola again nodded and said "yes." At trial, Officer Lee testified that he asked Escatiola to sign for the package. Escatiola signed "Carlos G." The officer observed that Escatiola seemed nervous when he tried to sign for the package. (2) After Escatiola signed, Officer Lee returned to the Federal Express van in which he arrived and left the residence. The officers who were conducting surveillance on the house observed a Suburban pull up to the house. They saw Escatiola load the package that had just been delivered into the Suburban. The Suburban then drove away. Escatiola left in another car.

The Suburban was stopped by officers soon after leaving the residence. The driver of the Suburban was Escatiola's neighbor, Robert Soliz. The package of marihuana was found in Soliz's Suburban. Officers also stopped Escatiola. Both Escatiola and Soliz were arrested and indicted for possession of marihuana.

In addition to the testimony given by Officer Lee, the jury heard testimony from Melissa Sotelo Garza, the niece of Escatiola. Garza testified that she arrived at Escatiola's residence around 8:30 that morning and stayed until after the package was delivered. Garza testified that Soliz was also at Escatiola's home that morning. Garza recalled seeing Soliz parked in the front of the house, waiting for a package. According to Garza, Soliz and Escatiola sat in Soliz's Suburban until about 10:30 or 11:00 a.m. Soliz then left the home to pick up either his wife or his wife's paycheck. (3) She testified that before Soliz left, he asked Escatiola to accept a package for him; Escatiola agreed. Garza testified that the package arrived while Soliz was gone. She stated that when Soliz returned, Soliz picked up the package from the driveway, put it in his Suburban, and drove away.

After hearing all of the testimony, a jury convicted Escatiola of possession of marihuana and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment. This appeal ensued.

II. DISCUSSION

 

A. Standard of Review

 

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). This standard is applicable in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). We are not fact finders; our role is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of fact's finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We will set the verdict aside only if: (1) the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust; or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15, 417; Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App 2000). We cannot conclude that a conviction is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust simply because we would have voted to acquit. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417. In other words, we may not simply substitute our judgment for the fact-finder's judgment. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 12. To reverse for factual sufficiency, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417. In examining a factual sufficiency challenge, we defer to the fact-finder's determination of the credibility of the evidence. Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

B. Analysis

To support a conviction for possession of more than five but less than fifty pounds of marihuana, the State must prove Escatiola: (1) exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) had knowledge that the matter possessed was contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).

When the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the controlled substance is found, the State must prove additional independent facts and circumstances that affirmatively link the accused to the contraband in such a way that it can be concluded that the accused had knowledge of the contraband and exercised control over it. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406; Naquin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Circumstantial evidence alone may prove affirmative links; however, proof that creates only a strong suspicion or even a probability will not suffice. Jenkins v. State, 76 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd). Affirmative links protect the innocent bystander and establish "that the accused's connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous." Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406; Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

Courts have identified a number of factors that may help show an affirmative link to controlled substances. See, e.g., Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406; Jenkins, 76 S.W.3d at 712-13; Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Gilbert v. State, 874 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). The following is a non-exclusive list of factors that has been found to affirmatively link a defendant to contraband: (1) whether the contraband was in plain view or recovered from an enclosed place; (2) the accused was the owner of the premises or had the right to possess the place where the contraband was found, or was the owner or driver of the automobile in which the contraband was found; (3) the accused was found with a large amount of cash; (4) the contraband was conveniently accessible to the accused, or found on the same side of the vehicle as the accused was sitting; (5) the contraband was found in close proximity to the accused; (6) a strong residual odor of the contraband was present; (7) the accused possessed other contraband when arrested; (8) paraphernalia to use the contraband was in view, or found on the accused; (9) the physical condition of the accused indicated recent consumption of the contraband in question; (10) conduct by the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt; (11) the accused attempted to flee; (12) the accused made furtive gestures; (13) the accused had a special connection to the contraband; (14) the occupants of the premises gave conflicting statements about relevant matters; (15) the accused made incriminating statements connecting himself to the contraband; (16) the quantity of the contraband; and (17) the accused was observed in a suspicious area under suspicious circumstances. Jenkins, 76 S.W.3d at 712-13; Lassaint, 79 S.W.3d at 741. The court determines whether the evidence is sufficient to affirmatively link the accused to the contraband on a case by case basis. Jenkins, 76 S.W.3d at 713, Lassaint, 79 S.W.3d at 741; Whitworth v. State, 808 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, pet. ref'd). The "logical force" the factors create to prove the defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance is more important than the number of factors present. Jenkins, 76 S.W.3d at 713; Lassaint, 79 S.W.3d at 741; Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd); Hurtado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Gilbert v. State, 874 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). The defendant's actions toward the contraband or the police may be considered an affirmative link. Payne v. State, 480 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Granados v. State, 843 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.).

In the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows the following affirmative links between Escatiola and the marihuana: the package containing marihuana was shipped to Escatiola's address; Escatiola was seen outside his home, talking on his cell phone and looking down the road the morning of the delivery; Escatiola and Soliz talked about the expected package and Escatiola agreed to accept it; Escatiola signed for the package; when Escatiola signed for the package, his hand was shaking and he was visibly nervous; Escatiola accepted the package by signing the name "Carlos G."; Soliz arrived almost immediately after the package was accepted by Escatiola and Escatiola loaded the package into Soliz's truck; and police recovered the package from Soliz's truck after he left Escatiola's residence. Additionally, when accepting the package, Escatiola twice identified himself as "Carlos Garza." Based on these facts, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Escatiola possessed marihuana. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Escatiola's conviction for possession. Escatiola also argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to establish an affirmative link between him and the marihuana. Escatiola asserts that the only evidence connecting the marihuana to him was that it was delivered to his address and that he signed for the package under the name of "Carlos G." rather than his own. After reviewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot conclude that the evidence is so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15. Nor can we conclude that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury's verdict. Id. at 417. A rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Escatiola knew that the package he accepted contained marihuana and exercised control, management, or care over it. We therefore conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support Escatiola's conviction.

Accordingly, we overrule Escatiola's first and second issues.

III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Escatiola's issues on appeal, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

_________________________

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,

Justice

 

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this the 23rd day of August, 2007.

1. Investigators later discovered that the shipper's address did not exist.

2. Officer Lee testified that he handed Escatiola a scantron to sign in a way where Escatiola could sign it, but Escatiola still flipped it around trying to figure out where to sign. While Escatiola held the scantron, the officer observed Escatiola's hand shaking.

3. When Soliz was stopped by authorities that afternoon, there was a woman in the vehicle with him that an officer thought was Soliz's wife.