GUADALUPE OLIVAREZ, JR. v. LA VILLA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT--Appeal from 370th District Court of Hidalgo County

NUMBER 13-04-345-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

GUADALUPE OLIVAREZ, JR., Appellant,

 
v.

LA VILLA INDEPENDENT

SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

On appeal from the 370th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Ya ez, Rodriguez, and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ya ez

Appellant, Guadalupe Olivarez, Jr., appeals the trial court's order granting a plea to the jurisdiction filed by appellee, La Villa Independent School District ("the District"). In two issues, appellant contends (1) the trial court erred in dismissing his case for want of jurisdiction and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing his case for want of jurisdiction because if, as the District claims, he was not employed by the District, he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. We affirm the trial court's order granting the District's plea to the jurisdiction.

Background

Appellant contends that on August 8, 2003, he was informed by the District's superintendent that he had been hired as a math teacher for the 2003-2004 school year. Appellant began his teaching duties on August 12, 2003. On August 21, 2003, he was informed that the District's board had voted not to offer him a contract. (1) That same day, he filed a "Level One" grievance. (2) On August 26, 2003 (before the District responded to the grievance), appellant obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting the District from removing him from his teaching position.

On August 29, 2003, the District filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because of appellant's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Texas Education Code prior to filing suit. Following a hearing on September 3, 2003, the trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order, granted the District's plea to the jurisdiction, and dismissed the case. (3)

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Because jurisdiction is a question of law, we review the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. (4) We apply the de novo standard to both the granting of a plea to the jurisdiction and to the denial of such a plea. (5)

A plea to the jurisdiction may be an appropriate vehicle for raising a failure-to-exhaust-administrative-remedies challenge to a plaintiff's suit. (6) Generally, under Texas law, an aggrieved party, whose claim relates to the administration of school laws and involves disputed fact issues, must exhaust his administrative remedies with the Commissioner of Education ("the Commissioner") before turning to the courts for relief. (7) However, there are four exceptions to this general rule. (8)

First, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the aggrieved party will suffer irreparable harm. (9) Second, an exception to the requirement of pursuing administrative relief is found where the claims are for a violation of constitutional or federal statutory rights. (10) Third, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the cause of action involves pure questions of law and the facts are undisputed. (11) Fourth, an aggrieved party is not required to exhaust administrative remedies where the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction. (12)

The Commissioner has the authority to reverse a decision of the school board, award back-pay, and reinstate a teacher to his former position. (13) In general, a teacher's claims of discrimination and breach of contract against a school district do not involve irreparable harm such that the aggrieved party may bypass these administrative remedies. (14)

Analysis

In his appellate brief, appellant argues that he is entitled to bypass the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies because he sought injunctive relief to avoid irreparable harm. According to appellant, he "alleged irreparable harm in the form of his removal from a teaching position without any due process of law." In support, appellant cites Houston Fed'n of Teachers v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1987).

We have reviewed the record of the September 3, 2003 hearing on the District's plea to the jurisdiction. The District noted that appellant filed a grievance objecting to the District's decision to not offer him a contract, but abandoned his grievance in favor of filing suit and obtaining a temporary restraining order. The District argued appellant was required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

Appellant argued that "one of the exceptions on the requirement for exhaustion of remedies, is when a district acts clearly outside the law." On several other occasions during the hearing, appellant argued that by attempting to treat him as an at-will employee, the District had acted "outside the law." However, appellant did not argue to the trial court that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because he would suffer irreparable harm. Because appellant's arguments on appeal do not comport with his arguments before the trial court, he has arguably not preserved any complaint for review. (15) However, even if appellant's issue was preserved, we find his argument to be without merit.

We find appellant's reliance on Houston Fed'n of Teachers to be misplaced. The Houston Fed'n of Teachers court found that parties are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies if irreparable harm will be suffered. (16) "[I]rreparable harm means that an award of damages months later will not provide adequate compensation." (17) In Houston Fed'n of Teachers, the supreme court reviewed the decision of the court of appeals that dissolved a temporary injunction barring a school district from lengthening the school day and dismissed the underlying suit. (18) The supreme court stated that parties should not be required to pursue the administrative process if they would suffer irreparable harm and if the agency is unable to provide relief. (19) In Houston Fed'n of Teachers, the trial court had issued a temporary injunction, finding the teachers would suffer severe, immediate and irreparable harm based on the teachers' testimony that they would suffer loss of child care, transportation arrangements, and second jobs if injunctive relief was not granted. (20)

In this case, appellant fails to show how the District's alleged actions would cause him any harm other than economic harm for which a later award of damages would provide adequate compensation. (21) Therefore, the irreparable harm exception is not applicable to his claims. (22)

We feel compelled to note that the District's practice of allowing a teacher, like appellant, to begin teaching duties prior to the District's approval of offering a contract, places teachers in an uncertain and unenviable position. At the hearing, appellant's counsel argued:

[Appellant's counsel]: There are no policies, Your Honor, for unhiring a person, for coming in and letting a guy teach two weeks and say that he is not an employee. There is [sic] no policies at all. He is not--the code never encompassed, never envisioned districts trying to treat employees, teachers, as at will employees, letting them go in for a week and letting them go. It is just not contemplated under the code nowhere.

While we do not condone the District's actions in this case, we agree with the trial court that it had no jurisdiction because appellant was required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's dismissal of this suit.

 

LINDA REYNA YA EZ,

Justice

 

Memorandum opinion delivered and filed

this the 29th day of March, 2007.

 

1. The District concedes that appellant began working without a contract and that he worked until August 21, 2003. According to the District, appellant was told and understood that all teacher contracts were subject to approval by the District's board of trustees.

2. Appellant's grievance form, dated August 21, 2003, states: "I was terminated after teaching at La Villa High School from 8-12-03 thru the end of my sick leave days for the school year." In the space designated for "specific facts" in support of the grievance, appellant wrote, "I was terminated."

3. The trial court's written order dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction was signed on April 2, 2004.

4. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).

5. Godley Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woods, 21 S.W.3d 656, 658 (Tex. App.--Waco 2000, pet. denied) (citing City of Houston v. Morua, 982 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)).

6. Id. (citing Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. 1986)).

7. Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Caramanian v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 829 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); see Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 7.057 (Vernon 2006).

8. Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 121 S.W.3d 88, 91-92 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2003, no pet.).

9. Houston Fed'n of Teachers v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1987).

10. Tex. Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90-91 (Tex. 1992); Nueces County v. Nueces County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 909 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).

11. Janik v. Lamar Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 961 S.W.2d 322, 323-24 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); Ball v. Kerrville Indep. Sch. Dist., 504 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

12. Tex. Educ. Agency, 830 S.W.2d at 90-91.

13. Dotson v. Grand Prairie Ind. Sch. Dist., 161 S.W.3d 289 292 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing Harlandale,121 S.W.3d at 94).

14. Id. (citing Gutierrez v. Laredo Indep. Sch. Dist., 139 S.W.3d 363, 366 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2004, no pet.)).

15. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Heinrich, 32 S.W.3d 280, 290 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).

16. Houston Fed'n of Teachers, 730 S.W.2d at 646.

17. Id.

18. Id. at 645.

19. Id. at 646.

20. Id. at 645-46.

21. See Dotson, 161 S.W.3d at 292.

22. See id.