John C. Spurlock v. James Schroedter and Amado Iglesias--Appeal from County Court of De Witt County

 NUMBER 13-05-00566-CV

 COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI  B EDINBURG

JOHN C. SPURLOCK, Appellant,

v.

JAMES SCHROEDTER, ET AL., Appellees.

 On appeal from the County Court of DeWitt County, Texas.

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Before Justices Hinojosa, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa

Appellant, John C. Spurlock, an indigent inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice B Institutional Division (TDCJ), appeals the trial court=s dismissal of his pro se claim under chapter fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.003 (Vernon 2002). We affirm.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant sued appellees, James Schroedter, Amado Iglesias, and other TDCJ employees, in the DeWitt County Justice Court for damages for the loss of his personal property when he was transferred from one TDCJ unit to another. The Justice Court dismissed appellant=s suit with prejudice, and appellant appealed that decision to the DeWitt County Court. The county court dismissed appellant=s suit with prejudice under chapter fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, finding that APlaintiff=s claim is frivolous.@

Appellant appealed the decision of the county court to this Court. We reversed the county court=s judgment and remanded the case to that court, holding that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the case as frivolous because Athe trial court could not have concluded that there was no arguable basis in law to dismiss.@ See Spurlock v. Schroedter, et al., 88 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2002, no pet.).

Following remand, appellees again moved to dismiss the case, and the county court dismissed appellant=s suit for failure to comply with the procedural requirements of chapter fourteen. Appellant now appeals the county court=s dismissal of his case for the failure to comply with the procedural requirements of chapter fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

B. Law-of-the-Case Doctrine

Asserting the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, appellant contends that this Court, in its previous decision, already decided the issues upon which the dismissal was granted and, thus, the trial court erred in dismissing appellant=s case. Although appellant couches his argument in terms of Ares judicata@ and Acollateral estoppel,@ we conclude that this issue actually involves the law-of-the-case doctrine and will address his argument accordingly.

The law-of-the-case doctrine is defined as that principle under which questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages. Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003) (citing Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986)). By narrowing the issues in successive stages of the litigation, the law-of-the-case doctrine is intended to achieve uniformity of decision as well as judicial economy and efficiency. Id. The doctrine is based on public policy and is aimed at putting an end to litigation. Id.

A decision rendered on an issue before an appellate court does not absolutely bar reconsideration of the same issue on a second appeal. Id. Application of the doctrine lies within the discretion of the court, depending on the particular circumstances surrounding that case. Id.

In our prior opinion, see Spurlock, 88 S.W.3d at 737, the question of law decided by this Court was whether the trial court could have found that appellant=s claim had no arguable basis in law to support the dismissal of the claim as frivolous. There are four grounds upon which a trial court may dismiss a claim as frivolous: (1) the claim=s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; and (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.003(b) (Vernon 2002). To enable a trial court to determine whether the claim is substantially similar to a previous one, chapter fourteen requires an inmate to file a separate affidavit or unsworn declaration describing all other suits the inmate has brought and stating the Aoperative facts@ upon which relief was sought. Id. '14.004(a)(2). In their motion to dismiss upon which the present dismissal was granted, appellees argued that appellant failed to comply with the requirements of section 14.004 by failing to list the operative facts of each suit in his unsworn declaration. Because our previous opinion was not decided on this issue, we conclude the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable.

C. Analysis

Appellant contends the trial court erred in dismissing his claim because he met the prerequisites of chapter fourteen, including the filing of an affidavit relating to previous filings.

Section 14.004 of the civil practice and remedies code requires an indigent inmate to file a separate affidavit or unsworn declaration identifying each suit previously brought by the person, and in which the person was not represented by an attorney, describing each suit by (1) stating the operative facts for which relief was sought, (2) listing the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought, (3) identifying each party named in the suit, and (4) stating the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious. Id. '14.004(a). If an inmate=s affidavit fails to comply with the procedural requirements of section 14.004, including the Aoperative facts@ provision, the suit may be dismissed. White v. State, 37 S.W.3d 562, 564 (Tex. App.BBeaumont 2001, no pet.).

Here, appellant filed an Aunsworn declaration@ with his petition, listing nine previous lawsuits filed. For each filing he listed the parties, the court, the cause number, the date of filing, the presiding judge, and the disposition of the suit. Next to the date, he also included what appears to be an attempt to state the Aoperative facts,@ which he described variously as (1) Awrit,@ (2) Atheft of 199991.18 dollars,@ (3) Aobstruction to the court,@ (4) Adistruction [sic] of legal files and property,@ (5) Afabracated [sic] disciplinary for access to Court,@ (6) Abroken contract,@ (7) Afraud,@ (8) Atheft of $9,000.00 dollars,@ (9) Aobstruction to access to court,@ (10) Atheft of property,@ (11) Adistruction [sic] of property,@ (12) Afabracated [sic] disciplinary,@ and (13) Ainjoinder [sic] civil action for violations of First Const. Amend. Freedom of religion.@ Appellant=s attempt to describe the Aoperative facts@ is, in effect, a designation of a legal theory; it is not a statement of the Aoperative facts@ of the case. See Williams v. TDCJ-ID, 176 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. App.BTyler 2005, pet. denied); White, 37 S.W.3d at 564. Based on the listing appellant submitted, it is impossible for the trial court to determine whether any of his previous suits are substantially similar to his present claim. For example, appellant labels two of the prior suits as Atheft of property@ and Adistruction [sic] of property,@ listing appellees, James C. Schroedter and Amado Iglesias, as parties.

Because appellant=s affidavit failed to comply with the requirements of section 14.004, the trial court was entitled to assume that appellant=s suit is substantially similar to one previously filed by him, and therefore, frivolous. See Williams, 176 S.W.3d at 594; White, 37 S.W.3d at 565. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed appellant=s suit. Appellant=s sole issue is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA

Justice

Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed

this the 29th day of June, 2006.