TOMAS R. RAMOS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 36th District Court of San Patricio County

 NUMBER 13-05-00015-CR

 COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI  B EDINBURG

TOMAS R. RAMOS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 On appeal from the 36th District Court of San Patricio County, Texas.

 MEMORANDUM OPINION[1]

Before Justices Hinojosa, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa

A jury found appellant, Tomas R. Ramos, guilty of two counts of the offense of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements,[2] and assessed his punishment for each count at seven years= imprisonment. The trial court ordered that both sentences run concurrently. In one issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

A. Standards of Review

1. Legal Sufficiency

When we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In conducting this analysis, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Vela v. State, 771 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi 1989, pet. ref=d). We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would (1) accurately set out the law, (2) be authorized by the indictment, (3) not unnecessarily increase the State=s burden of proof or necessarily restrict the State=s theories of liability, and (4) adequately describe the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. at 240; see Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (AWe believe the >law= as >authorized by the indictment= must be the statutory elements of the offense . . . as modified by the charging instrument.@).

2. Factual Sufficiency

When we review the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict only if (1) the evidence is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or (2) the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11. We are not bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and may consider the testimony of all the witnesses. Id. at 10-12. Disagreeing with the fact finder=s determination is appropriate only when the record clearly indicates that such a step is necessary to arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice; otherwise, due deference must be accorded the fact finder=s determinations, particularly those concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. A clearly wrong and unjust finding of guilt is Amanifestly unjust,@ Ashocks the conscience,@ or Aclearly demonstrates bias.@ Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

B. Applicable Law

A person who has a reportable conviction, such as sexual assault, must register with the local law enforcement authority in any municipality where the person resides or intends to reside for more than seven days. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.051(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (previously designated Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004)). If the person does not reside or intend to reside in a municipality, the person must register in the county where the person resides or intends to reside for more than seven days. Id.

A person does not commit the offense of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements unless he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to comply with the registration requirements. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 6.02(b), (c) (Vernon 2005). A person acts with intent with respect to the nature or result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the result. Id. at ' 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist; the person acts knowingly as to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. at ' 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly with respect to the circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. Id. at ' 6.03(c).

C. Analysis

Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for two counts of the offense of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements. Specifically, appellant asserts Athe State failed to prove [he] had a prior, reportable conviction for a crime that created his alleged duty to register as a sex offender.@

In Count 1 of the indictment, the State alleged that on or about November 10, 2003, appellant Awhile being a person required to register with the local law enforcement authority in the municipality where [he] resided or intended to reside for more than seven days, to wit: the City of Aransas Pass, Texas, because of a reportable conviction for sexual assault, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failed to register and report a change of address and provide proof of residence.@

In Count 2 of the indictment, the State alleged that on or about February 18, 2004, appellant Awhile being a person required to register with the local law enforcement authority in the municipality where [he] resided or intended to reside for more than seven days, to wit: the City of Aransas Pass, Texas, because of a reportable conviction for sexual assault@ . . . intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly failed to register.

Jesse Andrade, appellant=s parole officer, testified he was assigned to supervise appellant after appellant was released from prison for a sexual assault conviction. Andrade further testified that he discussed with appellant the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration Program, specifically that appellant had to register every ninety days and report any address changes to the appropriate municipal authorities.

Jeffrey Rickel, the police officer assigned to investigate appellant, testified he had verified documents showing that appellant was a registered sex-offender.

Ruben Rangel, appellant=s former employer, testified he had spoken with appellant regarding appellant=s release from prison. He further testified he knew of appellant=s prior conviction for sexual assault.

Appellant testified in his own behalf. Appellant admitted in open court that he had been in prison for the offense of sexual assault and that he had a conviction for sexual assault. Appellant also admitted knowing that he had to register as a sex offender.

Appellant=s penitentiary packet (Apen packet@) was offered and admitted into evidence without objection. The pen packet includes an affidavit signed by L. Leflore, Chairman of Classification and Records for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice B Correctional Institutions Division, authenticating the records. See Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The pen packet also includes a copy of the signed judgment of the court. The judgment states, in relevant part, AOFFENSE CONVICTED: SEXUAL ASSAULT@ and AIT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the Court that the [appellant] is guilty of the offense.@ (Emphasis in original.)

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and measuring it against the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support both counts of appellant=s conviction. Furthermore, after reviewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the evidence in this case is not so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust and the verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we hold the evidence is factually sufficient to support both counts of appellant=s conviction. Appellant=s sole issue is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA

Justice

Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed

this the 8th day of June, 2006.

[1] Because the issues of law presented by this case are well settled and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite the law and facts in this opinion except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court=s decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

[2] See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.055 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (previously designated as Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.04 (Vernon Supp. 2004)); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (previously designated as Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.10 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).