IN RE: PINTAIL PRODUCTION COMPANY, INC.--Appeal from 105th District Court of Nueces County

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

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NUMBER 13-06-069-CV

 PINTAIL PRODUCTION COMPANY, INC., Appellant,

v.

OSPREY PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC.

AND OSPREY PETROLEUM PARTNERS, L.P., Appellees.

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On appeal from the 105th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

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NUMBER 13-06-151-CV

IN RE: PINTAIL PRODUCTION COMPANY, INC.

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On Petition for Writ of Injunction and Writs of Mandamus.

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  MEMORANDUM OPINION[1]

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Castillo

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

This appeal and the request for a writ of injunction and writs of mandamus arise out of a dispute between oil and gas operators, Osprey Petroleum Company, Inc. and Osprey Petroleum Partners, L.P. (Osprey), and working interest owner, Pintail Production Company, Inc. (Pintail).

I. Background

Osprey and Pintail filed various tort and contract claims against each other in the underlying lawsuit. On January 2, 2006, the trial court granted Osprey's no-evidence motions for summary judgment against Pintail. On January 10, 2006, Pintail filed a motion for temporary injunction and on January 25, an amended motion for temporary injunction, claiming an interest in, and seeking to block the distribution of, approximately $10,000,000 (plus accrued interest) that (1) Osprey had placed in an escrow account jointly administered by Osprey and plaintiff Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) in connection with litigation between those parties, and (2) was to be released back to Osprey upon the settlement of the Unocal-Osprey litigation.[2] Pintail also moved for an evidentiary hearing on its motion for temporary injunction. Pintail requested that its temporary injunction remain in place "until all appellate remedies have been exhausted."

At a January 26, 2006 hearing, the trial court denied Pintail's motion for temporary injunction and its request for an evidentiary hearing. During the hearing, Osprey also nonsuited its claims against Pintail. That same day, the trial court signed a final judgment that "dispose[d] of all parties and all claims and is appealable."[3]

II. Interlocutory Appeal from Denial of Temporary Injunction

A. Analysis

On March 20, 2006, Pintail filed an appeal in cause number 13-06-069-CV from the trial court's denial of its motion for temporary injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2005) ("A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court . . . that . . . refuses a temporary injunction . . . ."); Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). However, a final judgment renders an appeal relating to the grant or the denial of a temporary injunction moot. See Isuani v. Manske Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); see also City of Corpus Christi v. Public Util. Comm'n, 572 S.W.2d 290, 297 (Tex. 1978) (providing that an "interlocutory order is by definition an order made pending the cause, before a final disposition on the merits.") (Emphasis added).

The trial court has tried the cause on the merits and entered final judgment in this summary judgment proceeding. Thus, this appeal relating to the denial of Pintail's motion for temporary injunction is moot.

B. Conclusion

Accordingly, this Court, having considered the documents on file and Osprey's motion to dismiss the appeal, Pintail's response, and Osprey's reply, is of the opinion that the motion should be granted. Osprey's motion to dismiss is granted, and Pintail's appeal of the trial court's denial of its motion for temporary injunction and the evidentiary hearing is hereby dismissed as moot.

III. Petition for Writ of Injunction and Writs of Mandamus

Additionally, on March 30, 2006, relator Pintail, filed a petition for writ of injunction and writs of mandamus in cause number 13-06-151-CV, and, on April 17, 2006, real party in interest, Osprey, filed its response to the petition.

A. Writ of Injunction

"A court of appeals is authorized to issue all writs necessary to enforce its jurisdiction." In re Gruebel, 153 S.W.3d 686, 688 89 (Tex. App.BTyler 2005, orig. proceeding) (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann. ' 22.221(a) (Vernon 2004)). "If an appeal pending before this Court becomes moot, we lose jurisdiction over it." Id (citing Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam)). Having decided the interlocutory appeal is moot, we have no authority to issue the writ of injunction.

B. Writs of Mandamus

The issues raised by Pintail in its petition for writs of mandamus address whether the trial court abused his discretion (1) in denying Pintail's motion for leave to supplement pleadings and reopen discovery; (2) in denying Pintail's motion to reconsider or clarify the summary judgment order; and (3) in entering a final judgment in the underlying litigation without allowing Pintail the opportunity to present evidence and obtain jury findings on its pled claims and defenses which Pintail asserts were not addressed in Osprey's motions for summary judgment. We conclude, however, Pintail is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because it has an adequate remedy by appeal. Compare, e.g., In re W. Star Trucks US, Inc., 112 S.W.3d 756, 763 (Tex. App.BEastland 2003, orig. proceeding) (providing that denial of leave to supplement pleadings is not a ground for mandamus), with, e.g., Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1998) (addressing complaint about denial of leave to supplement or amend in traditional appeal); see, e.g., Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. 1983); Southwestern Clinic of Bone & Joint Diseases v. Farmers Ins. Group, 850 S.W.2d 760, 754 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1993, no writ) (providing a judgment may be reversed via traditional appeal if an appellate court determines that the trial court has based a summary judgment on causes of action not addressed in a motion for summary judgment).

C. Conclusion

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of injunction and writs of mandamus, its record, and the response, is of the opinion that Pintail has not shown itself entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, Pintail's petition for writ of injunction and writs of mandamus is denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

PER CURIAM

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this 20th day of April, 2006.

[1]As this is a memorandum opinion and all issues of law presented by this case are well settled and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite the law and the facts in this memorandum opinion except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court=s decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4.

[2]On January 4, 2006, Unocal settled with Osprey, and on January 6, 2006, the claims between Unocal and Osprey were dismissed. On January 26, 2006, the trial court signed an agreed order dismissing claims between Unocal and Pintail. Thus, all claims by and against Unocal were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to settlement agreements entered into between Unocal and Osprey and Unocal and Pintail. Unocal is not a party to this appeal.

[3]A notice of appeal from the final judgment in the underlying case has not yet been filed.