Lafayette S. Archie v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al.--Appeal from 24th District Court of De Witt County

NUMBER 13-04-562-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

LAFAYETTE S. ARCHIE, Appellant,

v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, ET AL, Appellees

On appeal from the 24th District Court

of De Witt County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Castillo and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Castillo

Appellant, Lafayette Archie, an indigent inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal JusticeBInstitutional Division (TDCJ), appeals his pro se case under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.[1] See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.003 (Vernon 2002). He sued appellees,[2] seeking damages for lost property. We affirm.

I. Background

After exhausting administrative remedies, Archie sued appellees seeking "recovery of his lost property" or actual damages. He alleged that, upon transfer and return to separate units within TDCJ, his properly inventoried personal property was not returned to him. Archie filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a declaration of previous court filings, and a declaration of previous grievance filings. Appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting (1) lack of jurisdiction because the amount sought in damages was valued below $500, and (2) sovereign immunity. Appellees also filed a motion to dismiss under chapter fourteen of the civil practice and remedies code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.' 14.003. Archie filed a response, asserting generally that the plea and the motion had no basis in law or in fact. The trial court granted both the plea and motion. This appeal ensued.

II. Issues Presented

Archie presents two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting appellees' plea to the jurisdiction; and (2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing his lawsuit as frivolous.

III. Scope and Standard of Review

As a general proposition, before a court may address the merits of any case, the court must have jurisdiction over the party or the property subject to the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, and capacity to act as a court. State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994). If the district court lacks jurisdiction, then its decision would not bind the parties. See id. A decision that does not bind the parties is, by definition, an advisory opinion prohibited by Texas law. See id.

A trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error and may be raised the first time on appeal. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 442-44 (Tex. 1993). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Tex. Dep't of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Whether a pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id. Likewise, whether undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts establishes a trial court's jurisdiction is also a question of law. Id. However, in some cases, disputed evidence of jurisdictional facts that also implicate the merits of the case may require resolution by the finder of fact. Id.

When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiffs and look to the pleader's intent. Id. If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Id. at 226-27. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.

IV. Discussion

Assuming without deciding that Archie preserved error even though his complaint below differs from the complaint on appeal, Archie seeks damages under $500.[3] A district court's minimum jurisdictional limit is $500.00. See Chapa v. Spivey, 999 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. App.BTyler 1999, no pet.) (per curiam) (citing Tex. Const. art. V, _ 8; Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. _ 24.007 (Vernon 2004)).[4] Because Archie seeks damages under the district court's minimum jurisdictional limits, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction. We overrule his first issue. Because our disposition of the first issue is dispositive, we need not reach his second issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

 V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court's order granting the plea to the jurisdiction.

ERRLINDA CASTILLO

Justice

Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed

this the 13th day of October, 2005.

[1] Chapter 14, also known as the "Inmate Litigation Act," applies to a suit brought by an inmate in a district court in which an inmate files an unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 14.002(a) (Vernon 2002); Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 683 84 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that "a pro se inmate's claim under section 14.004 of the Inmate Litigation Act is deemed filed at the time the prison authorities duly receive the document to be mailed."). The parties do not dispute that chapter 14 applies. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) ("In a civil case, the court will accept as true the facts stated unless another party contradicts them.").

[2] Appellees are Doug Dretke, Susan Rivas, Fernater Smith, and Marianne Thieme.

[3] Archie seeks damages in the amount of $145.93.

[4] We observe, as appellees point out, that two of our sister courts have held that the district court's jurisdictional limit is $200. See Arnold v. West Bend Co., 983 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Arteaga v. Jackson, 994 S.W.2d 342, 342 (Tex. App.BTexarkana 1999, pet. denied).