Aransas County Appraisal District, et al. v. Patterson-UTI-Drilling (South) LP, LLLP--Appeal from 36th District Court of Aransas County

 NUMBER 13-04-502-CV

 COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

ARANSAS COUNTY

APPRAISAL DISTRICT, ET AL., Appellants,

v.

PATTERSON-UTI-DRILLING

(SOUTH) LP, LLLP, Appellee.

On appeal from the 36th District Court of Aransas County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Ya ez, Castillo, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza

This is an appeal from a judgment in an agreed case under rule 263. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 263. The parties, the Aransas County Appraisal District, the San Patricio County Appraisal District (Aappellants@), and Patterson-UTI-Drilling dispute whether appellants could lawfully tax appellee=s drilling rig. See Tex. Tax. Code Ann. ' 21.02 (Vernon 2001).[1] The trial court found that the drilling rig was not present in Aransas County for more than a temporary period of time. Based on that finding, the trial court ruled that appellants could not tax the rig. According to the trial court, the rig could be taxed only in Scurry County, the county of appellee=s principal place of business. Appellants now argue that the trial court did not properly apply the law to the agreed facts of the case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court for the following reasons.

Special rules apply to agreed cases under rule 263. A case submitted to the trial court upon an agreed stipulation of facts under rule 263 is in the nature of a special verdict and is a request by the litigants for judgment in accordance with the applicable law. Chiles v. Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co., 858 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). The court=s judgment must declare only the law necessarily arising from the stipulated facts. Id. The question on appeal is limited to the issue of the correctness of the trial court=s application of the law to the admitted facts. Id. at 635.

As stated above, the judgment in this case turned on the trial court=s finding that appellee=s drilling rig was not located in Aransas County for more than a temporary period of time.[2] Whether property is located in a taxing district for more than a temporary period of time is an issue of fact.[3] Appellants admit this in their brief. See Appellants= Opening Brief p.18 (AThe question of . . . tax situs is factual and dependent on the situation in each case.@). In other cases involving the trial court=s finding regarding tax situs, we have reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court=s finding. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., v. San Patricio County Appraisal Dist., 822 S.W.2d 269, 275 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court=s finding that oil was located in a county for more than a temporary period). However, in cases tried on stipulated facts, we are not allowed to review the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. City of Harlingen v. Avila, 942 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1997, writ denied). Appeals from such cases are limited to the single issue of the correctness of the application of the law to the admitted facts. Reed v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Co., 655 S.W.2d 259, 264 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1983, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

In this case, we cannot decide the correctness of the trial court=s application of the law to the facts without either making our own finding of fact (regarding the temporary or more than temporary presence of the rig) or reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court=s finding of fact. We are not allowed to review the sufficiency of the evidence in an agreed case. Avila, 942 S.W.2d at 51. Furthermore, neither the trial court nor the reviewing court is allowed to make any findings of fact that do not conform to the stipulated facts. Reed, 655 S.W.2d at 264. The supreme court has explained that the submission of a case based on agreed facts is an agreement that there are no disputed facts in the case. Hutcherson v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., 251 S.W. 491, 492 (Tex. 1923). In this case, the parties are clearly disputing a material fact.

Although findings of fact are ordinarily inappropriate in agreed cases, at times, inferential findings beyond the agreed or stipulated facts may be necessarily compelled by the facts as a matter of law. See Davis v. State, 904 S.W.2d 946, 950-51 (Tex. App.BAustin 1995, no writ). The trial court=s finding in this case was not necessarily compelled by the parties= agreed statement of facts. The law controlling the parties= dispute requires the trial court, in the first instance, to consider the amount and type of contact the property has with the government imposing the tax. Exxon Corp., 822 S.W.2d at 274. The parties have not identified, nor is this Court aware of, any case precedent that would compel the trial court to find, based on their agreed statement of facts, that the drilling rig was or was not present in Aransas County for more than a temporary period of time.

Appellants have not complained of any error regarding the trial court=s issuance of a finding of fact in this agreed case, even though the authority discussed above demonstrates that the trial court erred by doing so. See Davis, 904 S.W.2d at 946. Appellants= only complaint is that the trial court found the wrong fact. Appellants contend that Athere is no evidence to support the trial court=s finding.@ As noted above, we cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court=s finding. Avila, 942 S.W.2d at 51. We also cannot reverse the trial court=s judgment based on an error that was not raised at trial or argued on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (Preservation; How Shown); 38.1 (Appellant=s Brief); 44.1 (Reversible Error in Civil Cases).[4]

Accordingly, appellants= issues are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

_______________________

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,

Justice

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this the 26th day of August, 2005.

[1] The rig was located in Aransas County on January 1, 2002 and was appraised by the Aransas County Appraisal District for all but school district purposes; the San Patricio County Appraisal District appraises the area where the rig was located for the Aransas Pass Independent School District. Thus, only one rig and one physical location is involved, but two lawsuits were necessary.

[2] Whether property has been located in a taxing district for more than a temporary period depends on more than simply the amount of time the property has been located in a taxing district. Instead, the more relevant concern is the amount and type of contact the property has with the government imposing the tax. See Exxon Corp., v. San Patricio County Appraisal Dist., 822 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1991, writ denied).

[3] Rockdale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Thorndale Indep. Sch. Dist., 681 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.CAustin 1984, writ ref=d n.r.e.) (A[T]he question of permanent versus temporary in a tax situs context is a fact question and must be determined on a case by case basis.@); Lawson v. Groves, 487 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.C1972, no writ) (AThe question of . . . tax situs is factual and dependent on the situation in each case.@). Dallas v. Overton, 363 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.CWaco 1963, writ ref=d n.r.e.) (AThe question of whether or not the property in question is Amore or less permanent,@ as the term is often utilized, depends upon the factual situation in each case . . . .@).

[4] Of course, there is an exception to this rule for issues affecting our jurisdiction, M. O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004); however, our jurisdiction is not implicated by any issue relevant to this appeal.