FERNANDO CARRILLO v. THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 148th District Court of Nueces County

NUMBER 13-03-027-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

FERNANDO CARRILLO, Appellant,

 

v.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 148th District Court of Nueces, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez

Appellant, Fernando Carrillo, was convicted by a jury of one count of murder in the first degree and two counts of aggravated assault in the second degree. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 19.02 (Vernon 2003), 22.02, (Vernon Supp. 2006). Punishment was assessed at a prison sentence of ninety-nine years for the murder conviction, twenty years for each count of aggravated assault, and a $30,000 fine. Id. 12.32, 12.33 (Vernon 2003). By two issues, Carrillo asks us to determine whether the trial court erred in (1) proceeding to trial without first making a judicial determination that Carrillo was competent, as required by article 46.02, section 5(i) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) finding that Carrillo had the intellectual capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and allowing him to represent himself without obtaining further psychological or psychiatric evaluation. We affirm the trial court's judgment.I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On February 4, 2001, Carrillo shot and killed Joseph Valles and shot at Esmeralda and Felipe Nieto. Carrillo and the Nietos were neighbors and had been engaged in a property dispute for several years. Valles lived next to the Nietos and was their son-in-law. On the day of the shooting, Valles was working in his yard when he noticed Carrillo throwing beer cans and rocks at the Nietos' house. Valles asked Carillo to stop throwing objects at the house. When Valles turned to walk away, Carrillo shot him from behind. Valles fell to the ground. Carrillo shot Valles again in the back. After shooting Valles, Carrillo shot at the Nietos. The bullets missed the Nietos, but some bullets struck their house and automobile. Carrillo walked back to his house and attempted to hide the gun in a dog house. When he was apprehended by the police, Carrillo claimed he erupted. He was charged with one count of murder and two counts of aggravated assault.

B. Procedural Background

One of Carrillo's defense attorneys alleged he was not competent to stand trial and filed a motion for psychiatric examination on May 2, 2001. The court appointed a psychiatrist to examine Carrillo. The psychiatrist diagnosed Carrillo as suffering from paranoia, delusions, and grandiose self-ideals. A competency trial was held before a jury on February 14, 2002. The only witness was the court-appointed psychiatrist who testified as to his diagnosis of Carrillo. The jury found Carrillo incompetent to stand trial, but also found that there was a substantial probability he would attain competency within the foreseeable future. Carrillo was ordered to obtain treatment at a state mental hospital.

On May 10, 2002, a report ("the report") by a facility psychologist, which was signed-off and sworn to by the chief psychiatrist of the facility's competency program, was sent to the district court. The report stated that Carrillo had become competent and could assist an attorney with his case. Upon receiving the report, the trial judge ordered Carrillo recalled from the state mental hospital to jail so that he could stand trial. After recalling Carrillo, the trial judge recused herself, and a new trial judge was appointed. Carrillo appeared before the new trial judge on October 11, 2002, for a pretrial hearing and requested the right to represent himself. The trial judge warned Carrillo of the disadvantages of self representation, but Carrillo insisted on representing himself. The trial judge granted Carrillo's request, but appointed standby counsel to provide Carrillo with legal advice and to takeover the defense should Carrillo's self-representation become unsound.

The trial court held two more pretrial hearings on October 31, 2002 and December 9, 2002. In between the two hearings, a psychiatric examination was ordered. Carrillo refused to cooperate with the court-appointed psychiatrist; the trial court proceeded to trial without the results of a further psychiatric exam. Carrillo was convicted by a jury on all three counts on December 12, 2002.

The instant case was submitted to this Court once before and abated. See Carrillo v. State, No. 13-03-027-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6022 at *6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg July 28, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication). We abated the case because nothing in the record or trial transcripts showed that the psychiatric report was furnished or served to Carrillo in any fashion. See id. at *5; see also former Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, 5(i) (1); Schaffer v. State, 583 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). After the abatement, the trial court filed findings of fact stating that (1) the Nueces County District Attorney's Office was served with or received a copy of the competency report on May 15, 2002, (2) Carrillo's attorney at the time was aware of, informed of, or received a copy of the same report prior to May 21, 2002, and (3) Carrillo's attorney was afforded the opportunity within fifteen days to object to the findings in the report. The case was reinstated on October 5, 2005.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Determination of Competency

By his first issue, Carrillo claims that the trial court erred in proceeding to trial without first making a judicial determination that he was competent, as required by article 46.02, setion 5(i) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Carrillo argues that he was denied a competency hearing, a judicial determination of his competency, service and fifteen days' notice of the psychiatric report, and an opportunity to file objections to the report. See Fuller v. State, 11 S.W.3d 393, 394 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd); Byrd v. State, 719 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. App.- Dallas 1986, no pet.); see also Bell v. State, 814 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). Carrillo contends that the filing of the psychiatric report does not obviate the need for a judicial determination of his competency to stand trial. See Schaffer, 583 S.W.2d at 630. He asked us to abate the appeal and return the case to the trial court for a judicial determination of competency.

Former article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth explicit instructions on how an incompetency hearing must be initiated and what procedures must be followed. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02 5(a). A person judicially declared incompetent to stand trial may be ordered to obtain treatment at a designated facility for a period no longer than eighteen months or until the head of the facility medically determines that the person is competent to stand trial. Id. If the head of the facility determines the person to be competent, he must notify the court by affidavit. Id. at art. 46.02, 5(f). After such notification, the person shall be transferred back into the committing court's custody within fourteen days. Id. at art. 46.02, 5(g). In making a judicial determination of competency, the court is allowed to rely solely on the report issued by the head of the facility. Id. at art. 46.02, 5(i). However, both parties are entitled to copies of the report and to make an objection "in writing or in open court to the findings of the report within fifteen days from the time the report is served on the parties." Id.

Contrary to Carrillo's assertion, a judicial determination of Carrillo's competency to stand trial was made before the trial began. At the December 9, 2002 pretrial hearing, the new trial judge stated that he considered Carrillo competent to stand trial despite Carrillo's refusal to cooperate with a psychiatrist for the fall 2002 exam. Furthermore, during the trial, the prior trial judge was asked if a judicial or administrative determination of competence was made. She answered that Carrillo was competent to stand trial and that after she received the psychiatric report she recalled Carrillo from the mental health facility back to jail. The instant case, therefore, presents evidence of a judicial determination of Carrillo's competency to stand trial. Cf. Schaffer, 583 S.W.2d at 630 (abating an appeal because the record did not contain a judgment, order, docket sheet entry, or other evidence that the trial court ever made a determination of competency after the appellant's return from a mental health facility.).

We abated Carrillo's appeal and returned this case to the trial court because nothing in the record or trial transcripts showed that the psychiatric report was furnished or served to Carrillo in any fashion. See id. The trial court has since filed findings of fact, stating that (1) the Nueces County District Attorney's Office was served with or received a copy of the competency report on May 15, 2002, (2) Carrillo's attorney at the time was aware of, informed or, or received a copy of the same report prior to May 21, 2002, and (3) Carrillo's attorney was afforded the opportunity within fifteen days to object to the findings in the report. The record does not contain a timely objection to the report.

In the instant case, the trial court made a judicial determination that Carrillo was competent in accordance with article 46.02, section 5(i) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The necessary parties received the psychiatric report; and the necessary parties did not timely object to the report. Therefore, Carrillo's first issue is overruled.

B. Right to Self-Representation

Carrillo's second issue is that the trial court erred by finding that he had the intellectual capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and in allowing him to represent himself without obtaining further psychological or psychiatric evaluation. Carrillo contends that (1) he suffered from paranoid personality disorder and delusional disorder, (2) both mental disorders can degrade an otherwise normal intelligence, and (3) his mental disorders prevented him from making an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Carrillo claims that his mental disorders are evidenced by the February 14, 2002 determination that he was incompetent to stand trial (but with a substantial probability he would attain competency within the foreseeable future) and by his sometimes irrational behavior. (2) In essence, Carrillo argues that he was incompetent and could therefore not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.

The competency standard for waiving the right to counsel at a criminal trial is the same as the underlying competency to stand trial. Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993)). In dealing with self representation and competency issues, whether the defendant is competent to represent himself is immaterial; the appropriate question is whether he is competent to choose the endeavor. Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We have already held that procedurally, the trial court made a proper judicial determination that Carrillo was competent to stand trial. Despite Carrillo's assertions of irrational behavior before and during trial, a challenge to the substance of the trial court's judicial determination of competency is not properly before us. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h) (stating that a brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citation to authorities and to the record.).

The next step in our inquiry is to determine whether Carrillo knowingly and intelligently chose to represent himself. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court shall be afforded the right to assistance of counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). By the same authority, federal and state defendants are also possessed of the right to dispense with counsel in favor of self-representation. Id. at 814. A defendant's waiver of counsel passes constitutional muster if it is made competently, knowingly and intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. at 834-36. To competently and intelligently invoke the right to self-representation, a defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835). Generally, the record must be sufficient for the reviewing court to make an assessment that the appellant knowingly exercised his right to defend himself. Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

The record shows that the trial court thoughtfully addressed Carrillo's request to proceed pro se. Before it granted his request, the trial court questioned Carrillo regarding his age, education, understanding of the charges against him, and prior court experience. Carrillo responded that he had been in court twice before, the first time for a DWI charge and the second for an uncontested divorce, that he understood English, was able to read and write, and that he understood the charges against him. The trial court told Carrillo that he was making a mistake by requesting to represent himself and then informed him of the many disadvantages of self representation. Carrillo acknowledged the disadvantages and insisted on representing himself.

After carefully apprising Carrillo of the risks of self representation, the trial court allowed him to represent himself. But, out of an abundance of caution, the trial court appointed standby counsel. Before the trial, Carrillo's standby counsel conducted voir dire. During the trial, he answered questions that Carrillo posed to him and suggested questions for Carrillo to ask. Thus, standby counsel was an active participant in the proceedings.

On this record, we find that Carrillo was adequately admonished regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that there is no formulaic questioning to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver, but that a trial court "must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand," and quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948)); see also Dunn, 819 S.W.2d at 522 ("While the choice [of self representation] must be knowingly and intelligently made, it need not be wise."). Accordingly, Carrillo's second issue is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

ROGELIO VALDEZ

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

 

Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed

this the 12th day of October, 2006.

1. Although Article 46.02 has been repealed, it continues to apply in proceedings that were initiated before January 1, 2004. Act of May 29, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 415, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1095-96 (henceforth former Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02"), repealed by Act of May 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 35, 15, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 57, 72 (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B (Vernon Supp. 2006)).

2. An example of Carrillo's irrational behavior occurred during the hearing to determine whether he could represent himself. During that hearing, Carrillo asked the court whether a city councilman, a U.S. Congressman, and the Texas Attorney General could assist him. Carrillo apparently believed that they were rallying to his defense.